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Summary 
Competition law is intrinsically connected with economics and economic theory. 
This thesis tries to find out how economics is reflected in case law of the Court of 
Justice of the EU in competition cases. It discusses the role of economics in 
European competition law and in legal reasoning, and it examines limits and 
constraints of this role. Besides this, the thesis takes into consideration the role 
of the CJEU and some aspects of its work which may have influence on the 
perception of economics. The core of the thesis lies in the assessment of the 
practice of the CJEU. It focuses on the field of abuse of dominance and examines 
how the CJEU works with economic arguments, how its approach differs from 
economic theory and in which way the approach has developed over time.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“The use of economics greatly increases the likelihood of 
arriving at a result which is consistent with the aims of the 
competition rules.”1  
“An understanding of economic principles and their use for 
a correct interpretation of competition law is therefore 
an important part of competition law enforcement at the 
judicial level.”2 
Competition law is a field of law which is based on or at least connected with 
economic theory. In the first place, economics enlightens the necessity of 
competition rules. However, it may also help to shape the way how the rules are 
interpreted and applied because competition law as such is not able to identify all 
core elements which are important for analyzing alleged anticompetitive 
behaviour, nor could it sufficiently interpret the sole rules.  
In that sense, economics serves as a useful tool which helps us to deal with both 
legal and factual questions. The two above mentioned quotations just remind us 
that the role of economics is indispensable in case of enforcement of competition 
rules both on the administrative and judicial level. 
Currently in the EU, there is an increasing requirement to enforce competition 
law in the light of economics and to apply the so-called effects based approach 
that relies on economic analyses. The importance of economics is visible mainly 
in the work of the European Commission. However, it is the Court of Justice of 
the EU (hereinafter the “CJEU”) which shapes the ultimate competition law 
standards. Therefore it is vital to know how the CJEU works with economics, in 
                                            
1 Speech of Commissioner Mario Monti, ‘The Application of Community Competition Law by the 
National Courts’, Conference ‘Towards the Application of Article 81(3) by National Courts’ (2000) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-466_en.htm?locale=de>[access 06-07-2014].  
2 Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Economics in Court: Reflections on the Role of Judges in Assessing Economic 
Theories and Evidence in the Modernised Competition Regime’ in Martin Johansson, Nils Wahl 
and Ulf Bernitz (eds), Liber amicorum in honour of Sven Norberg: a European for all seasons 
(Editions Juridiques Bruylant 2006) 519.  
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what shapes economics in present in its reasoning and how economic inputs are 
reflected in its case law.  
Therefore the thesis will try to answer the question how economics is reflected in 
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU in the field of competition law. The 
thesis will observe, describe, conceptualize and assess the practice of both the 
Court of Justice and the General Court in translating economics into legal 
reasoning and implanting economic arguments and terms into law. It will look on 
the way how both courts work with economics and it will try to sketch a line of 
evolution of economic reasoning in courts.  
The aim is to make a picture and assessment of the reflection of economics in 
time, and thus the thesis does not focus just on the impact of the “modernization” 
or “more economic approach”, but rather it seeks to show the overall practice 
which may be influenced by new approaches.  
The thesis does not seek to develop a theory of economic reasoning, but it rather 
focuses on practice. In the beginning, it presents a theoretical overview on the 
role of economics and methods how economic inputs are pulled into legal 
reasoning, but the core of the approach is to assess the actual penetration of 
economics into case law. The theoretical part just tries to clarify the starting 
points, to define terms which are used in the consequent part and to anchor the 
normative premises of the approach. 
It is worth highlighting that this thesis does not settle economics as the ultimate 
good to which law, legal reasoning and courts and judges themselves should raise 
their heads. It neither suggests that more economics in judgments automatically 
means a better quality of judgments. Rather on the contrary, the very starting 
point of this thesis is that economics and economic reasoning are tools which 
should help judges in legal reasoning and which should be used within the limits 
settled by law and legal methods. Economics is still conceived as a tool which 
may be used correctly or not, desirably or not, in a criticisable manner, not 
efficiently, not enough or too much, but it is not the ultimate ruler or the highest 
goal to which law should serve. 
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Concerning the structure and overall approach, the thesis is divided into two 
broader parts: a theoretical part and an assessment of practice. 
The theoretical part will delimitate the playing field. It will discuss the role of 
economics in competition law, especially on the level of the judicial enforcement. 
Consequently, it will deal with the position of the CJEU, its role and methods. 
The aim of the theoretical part is to anchor the starting points of the research, to 
enlighten normative premises and to explain the context. 
The part devoted to the assessment of practice focuses on the way how the CJEU 
actually works with economics. Taking into account the sample of abuse of 
dominance cases, it will trace down how economics is gradually reflected in its 
case law and how economic arguments penetrate legal reasoning. The 
methodology of this part will be explained below.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Explaining the playing ground and characterising the 
player and its methods 
1. Starting points 
At the very beginning, it is necessary to delimitate the field for the research and 
to recall elements which may possibly have influence on the practice of the CJEU 
and which may affect or even shape the way how economics is reflected in its case 
law. Therefore the thesis starts with a rather theoretical part that discusses the 
overall context of economic reasoning of courts in competition law. Within it, it 
also tries to clarify the normative starting points of the research. 
The theoretical part encompasses two broader topics. First, it deals with 
economics as an object of the study. It defines what economics means in general, 
how it should be perceived in the context of European competition law, what is its 
role and position in legal reasoning, and eventually how economic reasoning 
should be understood in the framework of the thesis. 
Second, it examines and analyses the role and position of the CJEU. It focuses on 
the scope of its tasks, its characteristics, methods it uses and other elements 
which may have impact on its approach towards economics and economic 
reasoning in competition cases.  
The aim of the theoretical part is to shed some light on the context of economic 
reasoning, to explain and define some terms which are used within the 
consequent sections, to reveal the normative basis of the approach taken in this 
thesis and to recall some important aspects which may have influence on the 
overall output of the CJEU and which must be taken into consideration when 
assessing its practice. 
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2. The role of economics in competition law 
This part discusses several important elements regarding economics and clarifies 
its position as an object of the research. First, economics as a discipline is 
discussed and defined – with regard to the purpose of this thesis. Second, the role 
of economics within competition law both on the level of establishment of rules 
and their interpretation and application is elaborated. It is accompanied by a 
brief overview on the goals of European competition law as a possible limit to the 
role of economics. Third, the term “economic reasoning” is defined and its role 
within competition law is examined. Fourth, the intellectual process of 
translating economics into law is discussed.  
2.1. What does economics mean?   
2.1.1. Economics as a science 
Economics as a science3 has gone through a significant evolution, and especially 
competition economics has been influenced by several, sometimes even 
competing, streams of thoughts.4 Traditionally and for practical reasons, 
economists are divided and classified into different schools of thought according 
to their scientific starting points, scientific approaches, shared assumptions, 
standards, accepted theories, normative views or even ideology.5  
Even so-called mainstream economics, which is accepted by the vast majority of 
economists, covers nowadays a variety of approaches and views. Moreover, 
                                            
3 The question whether economics is actually a science was asked by Joseph Schumpeter in his 
famous essay where he claimed that “since economics uses techniques that are not in use among 
the general public, and since there are economists to cultivate them, economics is obviously a 
science within our meaning of the term.“ Joseph A Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 
(Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter ed, Oxford University Press 1954) 10. Cited in Ioannis Lianos, 
‘“Lost in Translation”: Towards a Theory of Economic Transplants’ [2009] Current Legal 
Problems 346, 351.  
4 A thorough overview of the development of economic thinking which influenced competition 
policy (including a collection of essays written by prominent economists of their respective era) in 
Daniel A Crane and Herbert Hovenkamp (eds), The Making of Competition Policy: Legal and 
Economic Sources (Oxford University Press 2013). 
5 For the overview of economic schools see e.g. Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Nicolas 
Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (Oxford University Press 2012) 71–77. In more detail 
also in Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules (3rd ed, 
Kluwer Law International 2009) 101–186.  
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economics is a continuously evolving and ever changing discipline. Therefore it is 
not possible to consider economics as one homogenous source of arguments.  
It is, however, necessary to determine how economics as a discipline is perceived 
and used for the purposes of this work. This sub-chapter brings a working 
definition of economics, and furthermore, it discusses its nature and authority 
within the sphere of law. 
2.1.2. Definition of economics 
Even if we simplify economics and regard it as one coherent discipline, it is not 
easy to find its single definition. Each textbook on economics includes at least a 
slightly different definition. To quote one example, Alfred Marshall’s definition 
from 1890 says that “[e]conomics is a study of man in the ordinary business of life. 
It enquires how he gets his income and how he uses it. Thus, it is on the one side, 
the study of wealth and on the other and more important side, a part of the study 
of man.“6 A rather recent example of the definition states that it is the “social 
science that studies the choices that individuals, businesses, governments and 
entire societies make as they cope with scarcity.”7 However, there are many other 
definitions which work with several keywords, such as human behaviour, choice 
and scarcity.8 It is argued that the subject-matter of economics is too broad to be 
successfully squeezed into a rather short definition.9  
For the purpose of this work, two simplified starting points are deliberately 
stated in order to overcome the heterogeneity and difficulties to define the field. 
First, from the subject-matter point of view, economics deals with human 
behaviour and choices in the world where resources are scarce and with reactions 
of firms and governments to the regularities of human behaviour. Second, from 
the instrumental point of view, economics represents a diversity of arguments 
                                            
6 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Political Economy, v. 1 (8th ed (first published in 1890), 
Macmillan 1920) 1–2.  
7 Robin Bade and Michael Parkin, Foundations of Microeconomics (Addison Wesley 2002) 5. 
8 For a thorough overview of the evolution of definitions of economics see Roger E Backhouse and 
Steven G Medema, ‘Retrospectives: On the Definition of Economics’ (2009) 23 The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 221.  
9 Ibid 222.  
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and opinions based on observations, different methods, competing theories, 
assumptions or ideologies. 
Therefore, although competition economics has been influenced by a myriad of 
schools and streams of thought, this thesis works with a simplification which 
tries to ignore possible biases and ideological constraints. It means that, within 
this work, economic theory is regarded as one variable comprising of all 
(sometimes opposing) arguments and ideas.  
2.1.3. Nature of economics 
Economics as a science may be divided into two branches: one which describes 
(positive economics) and the other one which suggests (normative economics). 
Taking it very briefly, as a positive science, economics tries to help us understand 
the world around, enlighten human behaviour and reveal certain regularities, 
while the so-called normative economics determines a desirable standard, and 
suggests solutions and approaches in order to reach the standard.10  
In the context of competition, positive economics turns smoothly into normative 
economics and vice versa, and therefore it is not easy to draw a clear demarcation 
line.11 It is even argued that competition economics has evolved into a more 
normative branch mainly in the second half of the 20th century.12 This evolution 
is connected predominantly with competing schools of thought in the USA which 
were based on different assumptions and ideologies.13 However, it must be noted 
that even normative economics lacks normativity in the very legal sense because 
                                            
10 In his classical distinction, John Neville Keynes defined the terms as follows: “a positive science 
may be defined as a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is; a normative or regulative 
science as a body of systematized knowledge discussing criteria of what ought to be, and concerned 
therefore with the ideal as distinguished from the actual; an art as a system of rules for the 
attainment of a given end.“ In John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political Economy 
(Macmillan 1891) 34–35.  
11 See Giorgio Monti, ‘EC Competition Law: The Dominance of Economic Analysis?’ in Roger Zäch, 
Andreas Heinemann and Andreas Kellerhals (eds), The development of competition law: global 
perspectives (Edward Elgar 2010) 5–6. Even Milton Friedman argues that “[c]onfusion between 
positive and normative economics is to some extent inevitable.” In Milton Friedman, Essays in 
Positive Economics (University of Chicago Press 1953) 3. 
12 Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit (n 5) 70. 
13 Very succinctly: Harvard School focused on the structure of the market, Chicago School 
emphasised the behavioural approach, while Post-Chicago School (School of New Industrial 
Economics) had a more dynamic view and focused on different strategic conducts.  
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it does not contain its own normative authority. The only authority economics 
holds is the argumentative authority. Moreover, economics has no power to be 
self-enforced.  
For the purpose of this work, it is important to note that economics itself does not 
include a benchmark to examine what is the “true”, “just” and “proper” 
economics. It can never serve as a revealed truth. Even in the field of competition 
law and policy, economics as such is not able to set authoritatively what the 
desirable approach is, what the ideal regulation should look like and how 
competition rules should be interpreted and applied. Thus, when lawyers (judges) 
have to deal with economics, there is no authoritative rule about how to use it.  
2.2. Economics in competition law 
The indispensable role of economics within competition law and policy may be 
seen from different angles. First, economics serves as a resource of knowledge 
upon which competition rules are based. In other words, economic theory helps to 
create competition law. Second, economics offers apparatus, arguments, methods 
and other tools to be used on the level of competition law enforcement. Both these 
basic roles are briefly discussed in the following section.14 However, economics is 
not the ruler in the field and its role is limited by the broader context of EU 
competition law which will be reminded in the first place. 
2.2.1. Economics in the context of plurality of goals in European competition 
law 
What is the goal of European competition law which constitutes a pivotal point 
for the interpretation of competition rules? The answer to this question is not 
easy, nor unambiguous. The debate (at least the doctrinal one) on this issue 
                                            
14 Coombs and Padilla interestingly claim that there is a 3-stage role of economics: (1) creation of 
law, (2) creation of guidelines on the application of the law, and (3) the application of the law to a 
particular case – see Justine Coombs and Jorge Padilla, ‘The Use of Economic Evidence before the 
Courts of the European Union’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), European 
competition law annual 2009: the evaluation of evidence and its judicial review in competition 
cases (Hart 2011) 474. 
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seems to be unending.15 Even if there are opinions that the only goal of 
competition law is economic welfare, the majority view agrees that European 
competition law is based on the plurality of goals.  
In contrast to American antitrust law which was always more tightly linked to 
economic efficiency goals, in Europe, the focus on efficiency has been (arguably) 
weakened by other corollary goals and the overall context of European 
integration. “Efficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust,”16 is just an extreme (and 
arguably too simplistic) opinion of Richard Posner that was never fully supported 
even in the USA17 and its validity is even lesser in the European Union.  
Historically, European competition law served as a complementary tool together 
with four economic freedoms in the aim to reach market integration rather than 
as a means to achieve pure economic efficiency. This role therefore represented 
“political necessity rather than an economic decision.”18 Later on, consumer 
welfare and efficiency started playing a more important role. In 2004, the 
Commission stipulated in its guidelines that the goal is “to protect competition on 
the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources.”19 
However, the objective of EU competition law still seems to be built on more 
pillars, among others the following ones: economic efficiency, consumer welfare, 
faire competitive process, market integration, innovation, competitiveness of the 
European economy, economic freedom, consumer choice and so on.  
Competition law thus may encompass more aspects than only those which 
economic theory puts into the normative basis. Moreover, as it is reminded by 
                                            
15 See a variety of opinions in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 
2012). And further contributions: Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals 
of EU Competition Law’ in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds), Handbook on European 
competition law. Substantive Aspects (Edward Elgar 2013). Pinar Akman, ‘Consumer Welfare and 
Article 82 EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ (2009) 32 World Competition 71. Maher M Dabbah, 
International and Comparative Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 36–44. 
16 Richard A Posner, Antitrust Law (2nd ed, University of Chicago Press 2001) 29. 
17 For a contrasting view see Robert H Lande, ‘Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of 
Antitrust’ [2001] 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 503. 
18 Roger Van den Bergh and Peter D Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 56. 
19 Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101 2004 97, para 13.  
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Eleanor Fox, “sometimes goals other than efficiency (in its various forms) may be 
in tension with efficiency goals, and a society may choose them nonetheless.”20 
To conclude this brief overview, it is apparent that due to the plurality of 
objectives, economic theory and economic considerations can never play the only 
role within the interpretation and application of competition rules. In these 
circumstances, economics represents a helpful tool, but not the only decisive one. 
2.2.2. Economics as a source of knowledge for creating rules 
Competition law is often considered a branch of economic law. In other words, it 
is supposed to be a legal field which is based on economic considerations. From 
the economic perspective, competition law is considered “an instrument for 
efficiency”.21 
Indeed, philosophical foundations of competition law lie in economic assumptions. 
Economics provides reasons why competitive markets bring benefits to the 
society,22 and it also offers explanations why and when monopoly situation in the 
market leads to economic inefficiency.23 Competition law then builds itself on the 
normative claim that economic inefficiency is an undesirable phenomenon which 
hurts society, and therefore competition rules prohibit such a behaviour which 
causes an inefficient monopoly situation – whether through cartelization, 
monopolization, or concentration.  
Therefore even if competition law does not emphasise efficiency as its sole goal 
and encompasses other corollary goals that the society wants to achieve, 
                                            
20 Eleanor M Fox, Cases and Materials on U.S. Antitrust in Global Context (3rd ed, Thomson/West 
2012) 49. 
21 Ibid 48.  
22 Very briefly: The basic theory says that through balancing of the demand and the supply, 
markets are able to reach efficiency in production as well as to allocate scarce resources 
efficiently. 
23 For a more detailed overview of economic foundations see, e.g., Posner (n 16) 9–32. Victor J 
Vanberg, ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom - on the Normative 
Foundations of Competition Policy’ in Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber and Rupprecht Podszun 
(eds), Competition policy and the economic approach: foundations and limitations (Edward Elgar 
2011). David W Barnes, Economic Foundations of Regulation and Antitrust Law (West Pub Co 
1992). Frank Maier-Rigaud, ‘On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law - Efficiency, 
Political Freedom and the Freedom to Compete’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The goals of competition 
law (Edward Elgar 2012). 
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efficiency is still an important source of inspiration for the law-maker to create 
competition rules.24 In that sense, economic theory serves as a resource of 
knowledge and arguments for determination and articulation of the norm, as well 
as for the establishment and wording of a concrete rule. 
2.2.3. Economics as a tool for interpreting and applying rules 
Besides this initial role, economics enters into competition law also on the level of 
the enforcement. At this stage, the founding and normative basis setting role is 
reflected and transformed into a set of tools for interpreting and applying 
competition rules. Its helpfulness or even indispensability lies in several forms.25 
First, economic theory is able to identify and clarify the content of vague and 
sometimes ambiguous terms and concepts which are usually used in competition 
law. Economics represents here an interpretative tool. Whether “competition”, 
“restriction” or “market”, law does not give an answer to what these terms mean. 
When interpreting these and other similar terms, economics provides for 
explications of what meaning should be assigned to them in the light of the 
normative basis and of the goal(s) of competition law. 
Second, economics provides an analytical tool which picks up the aspects 
necessary to create a legal test by which a concrete practice is assessed or to 
formulate other supportive arguments necessary for the reasoning In other 
words, it helps to formulate the legal test (i.e. then it is a legal method derived 
from economics) and as a consequence to enlighten the link between the rule and 
the facts (economic appreciation).26   
Third, economics and its corollary disciplines (statistics, econometrics, 
behavioural economics, etc.) offer various techniques, methods, algorithms and 
                                            
24 More about the normative foundations from the historical perspective in: Kiran Klaus Patel 
and Heike Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013); Heike Schweitzer, ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles 
of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), 
European competition law annual 2007: a reformed approach to article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 
2008). 
25 For the basic classification see Van den Bergh and Camesasca (n 18) 4. 
26 See Section 2.4.2 where different forms of economics are defined. 
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frameworks which are necessary within the assessment of evidence. It serves as a 
tool for the economic analysis of facts, and that tool may be both quantitative and 
qualitative.27  
2.3. Definition of economic reasoning as a part of legal reasoning 
Since it is difficult to define economics, a definition of economic reasoning cannot 
be made easily. Economic reasoning as such presents an economic way of 
thinking. For the purpose of this thesis, economic reasoning could be understood 
as using the economic way of thinking in order to make a justification. Such a 
process picks up arguments according to their economic relevance, links them 
according to their economic causality and makes justifications based on the 
relations between the arguments.  
Economic reasoning is, in this thesis, considered a part of legal reasoning.28 Thus 
it presents a specific use of economic arguments within a traditional legal flow of 
arguments. If we start with the classical definition elaborated by Neil 
MacCormick, legal reasoning is a “process of justification”,29 and in more detail 
“an activity within more or less vague or clear, implicit or explicit, normative 
canons. We distinguish between good and bad, more sound and less sound, 
relevant and irrelevant, acceptable or unacceptable arguments in relation to 
philosophical, economic, sociological, or above all, legal disputation over given foci 
of dispute.”30 Based on this statement, a plausible definition of economic 
reasoning would be as a process of justification which normatively accepts 
                                            
27 For more about the role of economic evidence, especially before courts, see: Luis Ortiz Blanco 
and Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, ‘Expert Economic Evidence and Effects-Based Assessments in 
Competition Law Cases’ in Massimo Merola and Jacques Derenne (eds), The role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in competition law cases (Bruylant 2012). Coombs and Padilla (n 
14) 473–483. Eric Barbier de la Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Economic Evidence Before 
the EC Courts’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 941. Ioannis Lianos, ‘“Judging” 
Economists : Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation : A European View’ in Ioannis 
Kokkoris and Ioannis Lianos (eds), The reform of EC competition law: new challenges (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business 2010). 
28 The same approach is advocated explicitly also by Anne-Lise Sibony, Le juge et le raisonnement 
économique en droit de la concurrence (LGDJ-Lextenso e ́d 2008) 29. 
29 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press ; Oxford University 
Press 1978) 5. 
30 Ibid 12. 
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arguments according to their economically relevant causal links and puts them in 
a coherent line. 
It means that economic reasoning in that sense does not apply a different logic in 
comparison to traditional legal reasoning. The technique is the same, but the 
specificity of economic reasoning lies in the choice of acceptable arguments and in 
the way they are evaluated and linked according to their economic relevance. 
In that regard it is worth recalling the difference between using economics on one 
hand, as a tool for examining law from the outside (economic analysis of law), and 
on the other hand as a tool serving to the legal reasoning in the inside (economic 
reasoning). Economic reasoning is different from the classic economic analysis of 
law which analyses impact of legal rules and tries to design them in an efficient 
way; rather, economic reasoning refers to economics in law – in other words, it 
represents a way of thinking within law.31 Therefore, economic reasoning does 
not serve as a tool for shaping, creating or evaluating law, but for interpreting 
and applying legal rules with the aim to attain a certain defined goal. In other 
words, it “refers to both deliberate efforts to apply economic insights as well as 
legal arguments which are very reasonably rationalized as resulting from the 
intent to apply economic insights.”32 
2.4. The transformation of economic arguments into legal 
reasoning 
2.4.1. The necessity to pull economic arguments into law 
“[W]hile industrial economics is highly developed as an academic discipline, 
application of economic theories and models in concrete cases remains an area 
fraught with difficulty and uncertainty.”33 
                                            
31 See to that point Endre Stavang, ‘Some Thoughts on Economic Reasoning in Appellate Courts 
and Legal Scholarship’ in Klaus Mathis (ed), Law and economics in Europe: foundations and 
applications (Springer 2013) 126. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Standard of Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent Case Law 
of the Community Courts’ (2005) 1 European Competition Journal 3, 17. 
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As it was elaborated above, economics plays an indispensable role on the level of 
the enforcement of competition law. However, its presence within legal reasoning 
is not automatic, even if economic reasoning as a technique is not different from 
legal reasoning as such. Both on the level of abstract arguments and on the level 
of application of economics to facts, there is a need for a process which will pull 
economic inputs into law. If we want economics to serve aptly to the needs of law, 
economic inputs have to be translated into a form which is comprehensible for 
law. Pure economics (regardless of whether it is positive or normative economics) 
needs to be transformed and adapted in a way that would fit into the legal style. 
It requires an intellectual process by which we transform economic thoughts, 
concepts, models and even arguments into a shape which could smoothly work 
within a legal reasoning. Lianos calls this process “the incorporation of economic 
analysis into legal discourse”.34  
This intellectual process involves several techniques or methods by which 
economics could be adapted for the needs of law. Although economics as such 
cannot prevail over law and must respect the boundaries of the legal system, the 
economic inputs may eventually inspire changes in the style of legal reasoning.  
Here the logic of the intellectual process is quite opposite to the discussion on the 
role of economics as a basis setting tool. At the beginning, economics served as a 
source for creating law, however, within the sphere of legal reasoning, law must 
opens its doors for economics again. As a result, once economic arguments are 
pulled into law, they become legally relevant arguments.  
Kelsen’s metaphor on the power of King Midas’s hand can be applied here in a 
rather adapted way. “Just as everything King Midas touched turned into gold, 
everything to which law refers becomes law, i.e., something legally existing.”35 In 
case of economics and economic considerations, we can use the metaphor saying 
that once law (in a form of a legal reasoning of the court) refers to economic 
arguments and accepts them, these arguments become legally relevant. If we 
apply this idea on the context of European competition law, there is the golden 
                                            
34 Lianos, ‘“Lost in Translation”: Towards a Theory of Economic Transplants’ (n 3) 368.  
35 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Russel and Russel 1961) 132. 
17 
 
hand of the CJEU thanks to which economic arguments, principles and opinions 
may be transformed into legal arguments. 
2.4.2. What are the methods and techniques? 
The added value of economics in competition law lies in the fact that it helps to 
understand the business practice, logic of the business world and the effects of 
practices on welfare thanks to the models. Based on consumer surveys, economics 
may enlighten behavioural patterns of consumers and consequently to explain 
the demand side of the market. What economics offers is “a combination of the 
inductive and the deductive to form a syllogism which purports to model 
reality.”36 It is a way of constructing a certain logic (flow of arguments) according 
to their economic causal links. Economics is able to identify the relevant facts, 
and consequently create a model according to a chosen theory. The facts are then 
examined through the prism of the model. All these kinds of knowledge then 
must be transposed into the legal system by various methods.37 
The process of translation may be done also on the level of the Commission, both 
within the decisions and in guidelines or other soft law documents.38 However, 
since the CJEU is the ultimate standard-maker, it has a powerful position. Only 
those arguments which are regarded by courts as being in compliance with law 
may eventually become a part of legal reasoning. In other words, even if the 
Commission or eventually parties of the proceedings bring new economic 
arguments on the table, it depends ultimately on the CJEU whether to accept 
them or not.  
Economic models serve as a source of economic knowledge which may be 
transformed into an abstract legal standard (legal test, economic statement of 
                                            
36 Maureen Brunt, ‘Antitrust in the Courts: The Role of Economics and of Economists’ in Barry E 
Hawk (ed), Annual proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: International antitrust 
law & policy : 1998 (Juris Publishing 1999) 362. 
37 The issue of importing techniques is in more details and with a slightly different classification 
discussed in Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Limits of Imports from Economics into Competition Law’ in 
Ioannis Lianos and Daniel D Sokol (eds), The global limits of competition law (Stanford Law 
Books 2012) 39–53.  
38 See the explanation of the power of economics and economists in U.S. antitrust on the level of 
creating guidelines in Eleanor M Fox, ‘When Economists Are Kings’ [1983] 71 Cal. L. Rev. 281. 
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normative nature). In that case, an economic argument is transposed into legal 
parlance in a way that it gives the structure of a correct answer to a legal 
question (for example: Is this behaviour an abusive predatory pricing? Does the 
undertaking hold a dominant position?). In that case, the legal terms (such as 
restriction of competition, abuse of dominance, significant impediment of effective 
competition etc.) are interpreted with regard to economic considerations. 
Economics serves as a starting point: it offers concepts analyzing the economic 
reality which must be transformed into a normative structure in order to fit into 
legal discourse. In other words, economics is able to identify features which must 
be present in order that we can say that a certain conduct presents an 
anticompetitive practice. However, the definition of all necessary aspects alone is 
not enough – such a statement must be complemented with a normative aspect.39 
A classical example of an economic statement, explaining why a certain practice 
is not desirable from the economic point of view and therefore anticompetitive, 
may look like as follows: “Where an undertaking in a dominant position directly 
or indirectly ties its customers by an exclusive supply obligation, that constitutes 
an abuse since it deprives the customer of the ability to choose his sources of 
supply and denies other producers access to the market.“40 The Court highlights 
the economic effects of certain clauses, notably the decrease of the choice which 
leads to lower satisfaction of consumers (therefore it is to the detriment of the 
interest of consumers), and artificial barriers to entry to the market in question. 
In other words, the statement explains the nature of a behaviour, shows its 
negative economic consequences (both on consumers and the market as such), 
and therefore concludes that such a conduct is abusive. 
When judges have to face the necessity to make the transformation from 
economics into legal reasoning, the first thing they have to deal with is to 
                                            
39 See similarly the discussion on the normative statements/legal tests/legal standards eg. in 
Sibony, Le juge et le raisonnement e ́conomique en droit de la concurrence (n 28) 607ff. Lianos, 
‘“Lost in Translation”: Towards a Theory of Economic Transplants’ (n 3) 368–372. Vesterdorf, 
‘Economics in Court: Reflections on the Role of Judges in Assessing Economic Theories and 
Evidence in the Modernised Competition Regime’ (n 2) 520–522.  
40 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II [1994] ECR II-755 [137]. 
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overcome so-called epistemic asymmetry41. It means that judges must, at first 
place, understand sufficiently how economics describes its model, how the model 
works and on which assumptions it is based. Only then they may accept the 
model and transform it into a legal standard. The process is often subtle and 
fragile. Since economics often works with assumptions, a result of a particular 
model may be completely turned over if the assumption is changed. Therefore 
judges cannot rely upon results, but they must know the assumptions and 
understand the process. The intellectual process therefore covers three steps. 
First, judges understand the model, second, they accept it as a normative source, 
and third, they proclaim it as a legal standard. 
Another slightly different type of the transformative technique is turning 
economics into a kind of presumption. Economics provides for models and 
evidence from the real world which show a certain level of probability of the 
consequences. Law, due to its normative power, then may deliberately make an 
artificial line dividing the issue at hand into a part where a further examination 
is needed and a part where it is not necessary to go deeper and assess details. 
Such a process helps to ensure legal certainty, and it may be more efficient from 
the procedural point of view because relying on a presumption may be less costly 
and less time demanding. It must be, however, recalled that a presumption may 
also limit further incorporation of economics into legal reasoning because the 
artificial line stops additional inquiries and potentially contrary arguments to be 
put forward.  
A good example of a presumption may be found in predatory pricing cases where 
it is not necessary to prove the intent to eliminate competition since “[a] 
dominant undertaking has no interest in applying such prices except that of 
eliminating competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by taking 
advantage of its monopolistic position since each sale generates a loss, namely the 
total amount of the fixed costs (that is to say, those which remain constant 
                                            
41 See Lianos, ‘“Lost in Translation”: Towards a Theory of Economic Transplants’ (n 3) 368.  
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regardless of the quantities produced) and, at least, part of the variable costs 
relating to the unit produced.”42 
The distinguishing feature of a creation of a presumption lies in pointing out 
which aspect must be proved and by whom, and what is assumed to be proved, 
clear or obvious. The automatic acceptance of the probability, as well as clearness 
and obviousness are derived from economic causality. 
The process of creating a presumption is similar to the above explained making of 
legal standards. Therefore when judges understand the economic logic behind, 
and accept the economic explanation, they are able to draw the legalistic line and 
create a presumption, which may be both rebuttable and irrefutable.  
Another type is creation of a supportive argument. It serves as an 
underpinning explanation for the standard, or for the presumption, or even for 
the assessment of evidence. It may include both an explanation of the 
consequences of a certain behaviour and a description of probable motives and 
incentives for the behaviour. Judges may use such an explanation directly 
without any specific need to transform it into law. When the explanation is 
understood and accepted by judges, they transplant it as a whole into the legal 
reasoning. 
A supportive effects-focused argument says what the possible consequences of a 
particular conduct are, and it explains in more detail why such a conduct should 
be deemed as anticompetitive. The Court may either explain hypothetical 
consequences of the particular behaviour (abstract reasoning), or remind concrete 
impacts of the behaviour on the market, competition and consumers (concrete 
reasoning). 
We can see an example within so-called “as-efficient-competitor” test used by the 
General Court in assessing the margin squeeze in the case Deutsche Telekom. 
The Court explains that “[i]f the applicant’s retail prices are lower than its 
wholesale charges, or if the spread between the applicant’s wholesale and retail 
                                            
42 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie [1991] ECR I-3359 [71]. 
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charges is insufficient to enable an equally efficient operator to cover its product-
specific costs of supplying retail access services, a potential competitor who is just 
as efficient as the applicant would not be able to enter the retail access services 
market without suffering losses.”43 
A similar form of economics may be seen in the explanations of the reason of a 
particular conduct. Economics is able to identify what a predicted intent of the 
alleged anticompetitive behaviour was, why the undertaking wants to undergo 
such a practice and what its intended goals are. 
The Court of Justice explains the intent of pricing below average variable costs in 
the following manner: “In such a case, there is no conceivable economic purpose 
other than the elimination of a competitor, since each item produced and sold 
entails a loss for the undertaking.”44  
Last but not least economics may be adapted to the needs of law when assessing 
the evidence. Here, the courts work both with quantitative or qualitative data 
and review methods which were used for the assessment for such data. Here, the 
most important role of economics is that it points out which facts are relevant, 
how they are relevant and why they are relevant.45 The evaluative method 
suggested by economists then requires a legal mind which would accept it as a 
legitimate process for the assessment of facts. 
Dealing with evidence through the prism of economics requires a two-step 
analytical work. Judges have to understand and accept the relevance of facts in 
the first place. Such a process entails a classical legal method where facts are 
subsumed under a rule. Consequently, judges have to understand and accept the 
method by which the facts are classified, compared and eventually evaluated. 
All above mentioned categories of transposing techniques and their results are 
not mutually exclusive. In practice, they may be combined. Usually one 
                                            
43 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2008] ECR II-477 [237]. 
44 Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak II [1996] ECR I-5951 [41]. 
45 See similarly Sibony, ‘Limits of Imports from Economics into Competition Law’ (n 37) 41–42. 
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statement of the court may start with an explanation in a form of a supportive 
argument and continue with a normative statement and so on. 
3. The CJEU in competition law 
In order to better understand the way the CJEU works with economics and to 
determine the prism through which its use of economics may be assessed, it is 
necessary to look at the CJEU, its characteristics, methods and style. This 
section will therefore briefly discuss the principal features of CJEU and it will 
elaborate briefly on the inner characteristics of its work, especially the style of 
reasoning and interpretative methods used by it.  
On the European level, there are two main procedures where the Courts have to 
deal with competition law issues. Within the review procedure, the General Court 
in the first instance and the Court of Justice on appeal have to control the 
legality of administrative decision of the Commission (Art. 263 TFEU), while 
within the preliminary reference procedure, the Court of Justice elaborates on 
the interpretation or validity of a rule stemming from EU law (Art. 267 TFEU). 
In both cases, the task for the CJEU is to guarantee legality. It has a rather wide 
scope for its work within boundaries of EU law, but cannot trespass the limits 
and go beyond.  
The way how the CJEU works and how its final outputs look like depend 
considerably on the chosen style of reasoning, on tools, methods and techniques of 
interpretation, and on the overall means how a decision is reached. Presumably, 
these inner characteristics of the CJEU may have an impact on the development 
of economic reasoning within competition law. This sub-chapter therefore recalls 
several aspects which may have such an influence.   
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3.1. Several remarks on the style of reasoning  
The CJEU and its reasoning reflect the legacy of the French system which served 
as the most influential inspiration when the Court was established.46 The 
institution was constructed according to the model of the French Conseil d’Etat, 
and the procedure was inspired by the French administrative review procedure. 
During the years, it absorbed influences from other legal systems within its work. 
Presumably, the German tradition played a certain role in developing the system 
into its specific form.47 Regarding the broad range of inspirations and influences, 
together with no authoritative guidance how to decide cases, the Court was left 
with a wide range of tools and methods from which it has created its own style.  
The style of reasoning is often labelled as apodictic, simplistic, mathematical, too 
syllogistic or too straightforward with no proper and clear explanation of 
arguments and reasons.48 The approach of the CJEU is even regarded as the 
“Cartesian discourse”49 which is characterized by the “pretence of logical legal 
reasoning and inevitability of results”.50 It is true that mainly early judgments 
were short, concise and simplistic, leaving no space for admitting alternative 
solutions. Due to other influences and inevitable development, the succinct style 
based on strict syllogism deviated from its French origin into a “specific” style. 
                                            
46 Ditlev Tamm, ‘The History of the Court of Justice of the European Union Since Its Origin’, The 
Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-
law - La Cour de Justice et la Construction de l’Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans 
de Jurisprudence (T M C Asser Press 2013) 17. Anne Boerger-De Smedt, ‘Negotiating the 
Foundations of European Law, 1950–57: The Legal History of the Treaties of Paris and Rome’ 
(2012) 21 Contemporary European History 339, 345–346.  
47 A brief explanation of the influences of the French legal tradition and the German system in 
Thijmen Koopmans, ‘Judicial Decision-Making’ in Angus IL Campbell and Meropi Voyatzi (eds), 
Legal reasoning and judicial interpretation of European law: essays in honour of Lord Mackenzie-
Stuart (Trenton Publishing 1996) 99. 
48 Ole Due interestingly points out that lawyers criticise the reasoning of the CJEU based on 
comparison with the legal system they come from because they miss some features they are used 
to. Ole Due, ‘Understanding the Reasoning of the Court of Justice’ in Gil Carlos Rodríguez 
Iglesias and others (eds), Mélanges en hommage à Fernand Schockweiler (Nomos 1999) 73–74. 
49 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Epilogue: The Judicial Après Nice’ in G De Bu ́rca and Joseph HH Weiler 
(eds), The European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press 2001) 215. 
50 Ibid 225. 
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However, the style is arguably still straightforward and discoursive patterns 
appear only randomly.51  
Such a style and approach condition, to a certain extent, the way how economic 
arguments are put into legal reasoning. In order to fit into the style, economics 
must be, arguably, transformed into a straightforward flow of clear arguments. 
3.2. Methods of interpretation 
The way how economics is pulled into the reasoning of the CJEU and its intensity 
presumably depends also on the general methods of interpretation that the CJEU 
uses.  
Regarding the sui generis nature of EU law, the linguistic vagueness of norms 
and value pluralism, the CJEU has developed a specific hermeneutic approach to 
interpret EU law.  It is generally accepted that the CJEU combines a variety of 
interpretative techniques. Starting with the classical textual method 
(grammatical, linguistic, semantic), the Court has to apply other techniques, such 
as contextual (systematic) interpretation, teleological (purposive) interpretation, 
comparative interpretation or historic interpretation.52 According to its own case 
law, the CJEU considers the teleological (focus on the objective of a provision) 
and systematic (consideration of the context) interpretation as the core tool for its 
reasoning.53 The Court explains it in the way that “[s]ince a literal interpretation 
[...] does not provide an unequivocal answer [...], it is necessary to place [the 
provision] in its context and to interpret it in relation to [its] spirit and purpose 
                                            
51 Sometimes it is argued that the discoursive elements appear in the CJEU thanks to opinions of 
advocates general who perform more detailed analyses and put on table even an alternative 
interpretation or solution. See, eg. Mitchel de SO L’E Lasser, Judicial Deliberations a 
Comparative Analysis of Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press 2009) 247–256. 
Michal Bobek, ‘A Fourth in the Court: Why Are There Advocates General in the Court of Justice?’ 
(2012) 14 Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies 529, 558.  
52 However, the methods may not be mutually exclusive, and there is also no proper consensus on 
their classification and terminology. In more detail about the interpretation and interpretative 
methods used by the CJEU, e.g. in Nial Fennelly, ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of 
Justice’ (1996) 20 Fordham International Law Journal 656. Giulio Itzcovich, ‘The Interpretation 
of Community Law by the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 537. 
Thijmen Koopmans, ‘The Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice’ in David O’Keeffe and 
Antonio Bavasso (eds), Judicial review in European Union law (Kluwer Law International 2000). 
Due (n 48). 
53 Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministére de la santé [1982] ECR 3415 [20]. 
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[...].”54 However, there is no authoritative hierarchy of methods which are used; 
the CJEU uses several methods at the same time in order to find an “optimal” 
solution. The choice of the interpretative methods may depend on the wording of 
a provision at hand, its clearness, the complexity of the case at hand and the sort 
of arguments raised by parties.55 Moreover, the overall approach of the CJEU is 
regarded as dynamic which allows for and at the same time requires a certain 
degree of judicial creativity. Since the Court was entrusted to authoritatively 
interpret an “incomplete”56 set of rules which are, moreover, vague and textually 
open, a kind of creative interpretation is unavoidable.    
The assessment of economic reasoning of the CJEU in competition law must be 
seen through the prism of its interpretative methods and of its overall approach 
to interpretation of competition law.  Since the essential competition provisions 
are based on vague and textually open rules, the teleological and systematic 
interpretation is very important. It was explicitly mentioned in Continental Can 
where the Court highlighted the necessity to look into “the spirit”, “the general 
scheme and wording” and “the system and objectives of the Treaty”.57  
However, what must be recalled is the issue of the plurality of goals.58 
Teleological interpretation presumes that there is a telos of a rule, a goal which 
must be reached. The plurality of goals and the ambiguity of the telos therefore 
bring a kind of obstacle or rather a challenge for the interpretation as such. 
3.3. Other aspects related to the decision-making of the CJEU 
Although the CJEU is bound by the obligation to state reasons, sometimes its 
decisions may contain argumentative or logical gaps and “[i]n extreme cases the 
reasoning may even be confined to a pure statement without any argument 
                                            
54  Case C-257/00 Nani Givane [2003] ECR I-345 [38]. 
55 It is highlighted, based on personal professional experience, by former Judge Kutscher in Hans 
Kutscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation as Seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice’, Judicial and 
Academic Conference 27-28 September 1976 (Court of Justice of the European Communities 1976) 
I–15. 
56 Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press 2004) 23–25. 
57 Case 6/72 Continental Can [1973] ECR 215 [22]. 
58 More about the interpretative methods in the context of goals of competition law in Lianos, 
‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law’ (n 15) 68–75. 
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supporting”59. Such gaps and shortages are probably caused by attempts to find a 
compromise among the members of the judicial chamber when deciding upon the 
wording of the judgment. The CJEU itself excuses this deficiency by the necessity 
to speak with one voice.60 Presumably, the compromising character of the 
reasoning may slow down the development in the perception of new economic 
arguments into the legal reasoning. 
What is worth mentioning is also the reliance of the CJEU upon its own case 
law.61 The potential deviation from settled case law is limited by the effort to 
ensure basic legal principles, such as legal certainty, legitimate expectations or 
predictability of the decision-making. However, these principles are, sometimes 
and to certain extent, sacrificed in the name of the integration and the Court 
therefore applies more dynamic methodology to serve to this goal.62 Overruling of 
earlier case law is therefore not impossible,63 but the Court deviates rather 
carefully, cautiously and slowly.64 Only in rare cases, it explicitly admits that its 
reasoning is contrary to settled case law.65 
Last but not least, the overall discretion of the CJEU must be mentioned.66  It is 
in hands of the CJEU to choose which tools it would use and which method it 
would apply. In that sense, the CJEU holds a certain power which has no strict 
                                            
59 Due (n 48) 82. 
60 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External and Internal 
Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice’ in Maurice Adams and others (eds), Judging 
Europe’s judges: the legitimacy of the case law of the European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 
2013) 46. 
61 In detail on the reliance on case law in Marc A Jacob, Precedents and Case-Based Reasoning in 
the European Court of Justice: Unfinished Business (Cambridge University Press 2014). The 
precedent-like nature of case law of the CJ is discussed in Jan Komárek, ‘Precedent and Judicial 
Lawmaking in Supreme Courts: The Court of Justice Compared to the US Supreme Court and the 
French Cour de Cassation’ (2008) 11 Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies 399. See also 
Gunnar Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hart Publishing 2012) 92–
114. 
62 See similarly Rostane Mehdi, ‘Le Revirement Jurisprudentiel En Droit Communautaire’, 
L’intégration européenne au XXIe siècle: en hommage à Jacques Bourrinet (Documentation 
française 2004) 114. 
63 In more detail on the overruling in the CJ in Jacob (n 61) 155–182. The author enumerates the 
reasons for the overruling, such as: incorrectly decided precedent, the precedent is not workable 
in practice, incompatibility with subsequent decisions, incompatibility with other changes in the 
law, imbalance between principles, and changed circumstances and factual context. 
64 See a kind of explanation in Stone Sweet (n 56) 30–37. 
65 For example in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097 
[16]. 
66 See more about the judicial discretion in Stone Sweet (n 56) 23–41. 
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limits. It is an ultimate standard-maker and interpreter of EU law, and even if 
other institutions and Member States may overrule its approach, change the 
goals or directions of EU law, even if other stakeholders may suggest other 
novelties,67 their influence is limited. As a result, in all these cases the CJEU still 
keeps a high margin of discretion when it comes to the choice of arguments due to 
several external conditions. 
First, new arguments or suggestions to change a direction of the approach may 
come through changes in written law and new inputs may appear in soft law.68 
However, it is hard to make radical changes of written law when a consensus is 
needed to be reached on the political level.69 Therefore the other stakeholders 
have no invincible coercion power to persuade the CJEU and to influence 
authoritatively the way of legal reasoning and the choice of arguments, and the 
CJEU keeps a space to develop its approach on its own. 
Second, parties of a case may try to persuade the CJEU to change its approach 
within a particular case. The CJEU has also to face opinions of experts and other 
suggestions from subjects in the position of amicus curiae. However, it is 
naturally upon the Court to accept them or not, therefore the acceptance of new 
(economic) arguments may be rather random. 
Third, the limit of the CJEU is that it is strictly allowed only to guarantee 
legality. However, since the contours of EU law as such are not crystal clear, the 
scope of practice is also not precisely defined, and thus the CJEU holds a certain 
power to make a creative interpretation.  
                                            
67 More about the countervailing powers of the ECJ in Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in 
the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking (M Nijhoff 1986) 
75–80. 
68 In competition law, there seems to be a considerable and often appreciated reliance on soft law 
issued by the Commission (in a form of guidelines or guidance). Their influence is presumably 
increasing. 
69 Karen J Alter, ‘Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty?”: European Governments and the 
European Court of Justice’, The European Court’s political power: selected essays (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 124–128. 
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3.4. Interim conclusion 
It may be argued that the above mentioned aspects (style of reasoning, methods 
of interpretation, obedience to own case law, argumentative gaps) have certain 
influence on the perception and reflection of economics and economic reasoning in 
case law of the CJEU.  
Each aspect, however, may be influential in a different way. While the focus on 
teleological interpretation, on one hand, opens a door for new (potentially 
economic) arguments, the rather apodictic style of the reasoning may, on the 
other hand, restricts the quantity of economic arguments in judgments. The 
restrictive feature may be seen also in the reliance upon settled case law. The 
CJEU is, presumably, not willing to make too significant developments of the 
reasoning unless it is unavoidable. The necessity to speak unequivocally, which 
seemingly causes logical shortage in the flow of arguments within a judgment, 
may then explain, to a certain extent, a careful “economization” of the reasoning. 
4. Conclusion of the theoretical part 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, a former chief economist at DG Competition, European 
Commission, highlights its belief that “the use of economics will increase the 
precision of DG COMP’s decisions, that is, it will reduce type I and type II 
errors.”70 Presumably and with the same logic, the use of economics should 
increase the precision of even the CJEU’s output – despite the fact that the CJEU 
is limited only to review of legal aspects of Commission’s decision or to binding 
legal interpretation within the preliminary ruling procedure. In any event, in EU 
competition law, there is a highly necessary and at the same time fragile role of 
courts to understand economics and economic arguments and turn them into 
legally acceptable forms. 
                                            
70 Lars-Hendrik Röller, ‘Economic Analysis of Article 82’ in Abel M Mateus and Teresa Moreira 
(eds), Competition law and economics : advances in competition policy and antitrust enforcement 
(Kluwer Law International 2007) 325. 
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Before looking whether and how the CJEU really applies economic arguments 
into its reasoning, it is necessary to recall the context and to assess its practice 
through the lenses of above explained factors, mainly the following ones. 
First, the CJEU is, above all, a guardian of legality in the EU. It must ensure 
coherence of EU law, protect rule of law and keep fundamental legal principles 
such as legal certainty. Sometimes the reluctance to accept new economic 
solutions is just explained by the attempt not to damage legal certainty.  
Second, the scope of tasks of the CJEU is limited to legality review or to 
interpretation of EU law. Such a delimitation of the work also restricts the space 
where the CJEU may use economics and how it may apply it and pull into law. 
Third, economics is a heterogeneous discipline which offers a variety of 
(sometimes contradictory) arguments. Each argument is considerably based on 
assumptions, and when an assumption changes, the whole argument modifies its 
direction. Therefore, for any court, it is a challenge to accept an economic 
argument in order to serve conveniently to law. 
Fourth, even if consumer welfare as a highly economic standard is the currently 
most proclaimed goal of European competition law, competition law and policy is 
still built on more pillars and other goals must be taken into consideration as 
well.  
Fifth, the whole reflection of economics into legal reasoning of the CJEU should 
be assessed in the context of its overall style of reasoning and methods of 
interpretation. Although there might be economists or commentators focusing 
solely on competition law, and therefore criticising its approach in this field, the 
practice requires a broader perspective to be understood sufficiently.  
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ASSESSMENT OF PRACTICE 
Reflection of economics in reasoning of the CJEU 
5. Content and methodology 
5.1. Framework, approach, methods 
The following part will deal with the question how economics, as defined in the 
theoretical chapter, is reflected in practice and in concrete judgments of the 
CJEU. It contains two chapters.  
The first chapter works with a lexical analysis. It examines how much the CJEU 
uses economic terminology, and therefore it shows a formal reflection of 
economics in judgments and a potential development over time. 
The second chapter is the most robust one. It deals with the development of 
economic reasoning over time. The aim of the chapter is to study and keep an eye 
on the line of gradual enrichment of reasoning by economic inputs, and therefore 
to shed some light on the way how the CJEU works with economics and 
transforms it into legal reasoning within assessment of particular practices. 
Concerning the subject-matter of the study, the assessment of practice is not 
devoted to the whole field of competition law, but it focuses solely on the field of 
abuse of dominance. The reflection of economics in the reasoning of the CJEU is 
therefore tested within judgments based on Art. 102 TFEU.  
Regarding the time-framework, the chapter devoted to lexical analysis will work 
with judgments issued between 1990 and 2013, while the chapter dealing with 
economic reasoning will take into consideration all judgments issued by the CJ or 
GC till nowadays.  
31 
 
5.2. Abuse of dominance in EU competition law 
The legal rule on the abuse of dominance is embedded in Art. 102 TFEU which 
stipulates:  
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States.” 
The wording of the rule is short and simple. However, it “is a difficult rule of law 
which is, unfortunately neither clear nor simple to apply in practice.”71 The 
shorter the text, the greater space for interpretation and application it offers. 
This supports the view that law is not a self-standing system. It desperately 
needs inputs from around to be able to function properly. Within their practice, 
both the European Commission and European courts have developed a myriad of 
approaches and ideas how to fulfil the rather empty, vague and abstract norm 
with viable and reality-related arguments.  
Generally speaking, the goal of Article 102 TFEU is to safeguard the efficient 
competition against restraints caused by an excessive economic power of one or 
more undertakings. It serves as a mid-goal to the overall goals of EU competition 
law – to protect efficient competition,72 to ensure consumer welfare73 and to 
contribute to working internal market. 
Despite the gradual strengthening of the role of economics within the competition 
law enforcement, its role is not as strong in all fields of competition law. In that 
sense, the merger control represents the most developed part of competition law, 
while the field of abuse of dominance is considered to be “[t]he last remaining 
                                            
71 Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Epilogue’ in Luca Rubini (ed), Microsoft on trial: legal and economic analysis of 
a transatlantic antitrust case (Edward Elgar 2010) 487. 
72 Case 6/72 Continental Can (n 57) [26]. Case T-219/99 British Airways plc v Commission [2003] 
ECR 5917 [311]. 
73 Case 6/72 Continental Can (n 57) [26]. Joined cases 40/73 et al, Suiker Unie [1975] ECR 1663 
[526]. Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar [1999] ECR II-2969 [111].  
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bulwark of “economics light””.74 The “economization” of competition law in the 
late1990s came with a wave of Commission’s soft law documents.75 Through the 
prism of the soft law activity, the field of abuse of dominance was the last one 
which was “more economized”. It is claimed that even on the level of judicial 
reasoning, it remains the least “economically” developed discipline. The following 
parts will focus on such a development. However, they will not assess it in 
comparison with other fields of competition law.   
6. Reflection of economic reasoning 
6.1. Lexical analysis and quantitative assessment 
In the following chapter a quantitative lexical analysis of judgments will be 
performed. At this stage, the subject of the inquiry is not economic reasoning as 
such or comprehensive economic arguments, but rather the sole economic 
terminology. 
So-called “explicitly economic terms” will be searched for. These are terms and 
concepts of mainstream76 economics which are taken from economic theory and 
used directly in the legal reasoning without being transposed into legal parlance 
or changed. They are traditionally used in economic theory as tools to describe 
economically relevant issues and within legal reasoning they have (supposedly) 
the same meaning. Therefore, the advantage of using these terms in legal 
reasoning is that their meaning is clear from the economic terminology, and law 
just takes them as tools with already defined content.77 
                                            
74 Quotation from Van den Bergh and Camesasca (n 18) 3. For similar opinions see, e.g., Damien 
Geradin and Nicolas Petit, ‘Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative 
and Qualitative Assessment’ in Massimo Merola and Jacques Derenne (eds), The role of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in competition law cases (Bruylant 2012) 65. 
75 Notice on the relevant market (1997), Guidelines to vertical restraints (2000), Horizontal 
merger guidelines (2004), and lately Notice on the application of Art. 82 (2009). 
76 By mainstream economics I mean widely accepted economics as it is taught across universities 
world-wide and found in textbooks, such as Paul A Samuelson, Economics (17th ed, McGraw-Hill 
2001). N Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (6th Ed, Cengage Learning 2013).   
77 Lianos calls them “economic transplants”. See Lianos, ‘“Lost in Translation”: Towards a Theory 
of Economic Transplants’ (n 3) 350ff. 
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It is obvious that the sole presence of economic terminology does not explain 
properly how the Courts work with economics and economic arguments in its 
reasoning. It says only how willing the Court is to adopt the economic language 
and to put it directly to the text of the reasoning. However, the presence of 
economic terms may show how is economics reflected formally and what is the 
impact on the reasoning at first sight.  
The following economic terms were selected to be searched for within the text of 
legal reasoning of the Courts. Some of the terms were selected from among terms 
used and defined in the OECD Glossary78, some others were added because of 
their actual appearance in judgments.79 The researched economic terms are (in 
alphabetical order): allocative efficiency, average variable costs, barriers to entry, 
consumer welfare, contestability, economies of scale, efficiency, elasticity, 
incremental cost, marginal costs, market power, monopoly, oligopoly, profit 
maximization, SSNIP test, substitutability, supply and demand, surplus, total 
costs.  
The time scope is from 1990 to 2013 (after the establishment of the Court of First 
Instance/General Court till nowadays). 
Moreover, the research focuses solely on the own reasoning of the courts and 
within it only on substantive issues. Procedural questions are deliberately 
ignored. Reasoning dealing with the amount of the fine is excluded as well. 
Therefore in analyzing the text of each judgment, only those parts of the 
judgment entitled “The findings of the Court” dealing with substantive issues, 
are taken into account. Parts of the text where the court repeats the facts of the 
case, and where it summarizes submissions of the parties and/or interveners, are 
deliberately ignored.  
First, an analysis of the judgments of the General Court is made, and then the 
same is done for the judgments of the Court of Justice. 
                                            
78 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Glossary of Industrial Organisation 
Economics and Competition Law (OECD Publishing 1993). Some terms were added because of 
their actual appearance in judgments. 
79 They were considered economic terms and therefore chosen by the author. 
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6.1.1. Explicit economic terms in judicial review judgments of the General 
Court in Art. 102 TFEU cases 
The economic terms were searched for in the sample of 27 judgments (time 
framework 1989 – 2013) of the General Court. These are appeal for annulment 
cases solely. 
In the following table, we can see how often the General Court uses concrete 
terms. The most frequent terms are monopoly, substitutability, supply and 
demand, economies of scale and market power.  
On the other hand, none of the examined judgments includes very economic 
terms, which are deemed to be the core of competition economics, such as 
consumer welfare, market failure, marginal cost or allocative efficiency. When 
they actually appear in the text of the judgment, they are only mentioned within 
the summary of the parties′ submissions and they are not used within the own 
reasoning of the court. 
It is interesting that one of the essential economic concepts – consumer welfare80 
– does not appear in any of the examined judgments. In the EU, consumer 
welfare has recently gained a prominent position between the goals of 
competition policy.81 However, according to the simple lexical analysis of case 
law, it is apparent that the General Court is not used to working with the 
economic term consumer welfare expressly. The reasons for such a result may be 
only estimated. It is possible that the Court is cautious when referring to the 
ultimate goal of competition law and works with consumer welfare only 
implicitly.  
                                            
80 Consumer welfare is an economic term which encompasses the maximisation of consumer 
surplus which is a part of total surplus. In other words, it is the difference between what 
consumers are willing to pay and what they actually pay. From the economic point of view, it is a 
result of the allocative efficiency of the competition.  
81 See Russel W Pittman, ‘Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust 
Enforcement’ (2007) 3 Competition Policy International 205, 205. Richard Whish, Competition 
Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press 2012) 19–20. Kati Cseres, ‘The Controversies of the 
Consumer Welfare Standard’ (2006) 3 Competition Law Review 122, 123. 
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Table 1: The presence of explicit economic terms in Art. 102 TFEU judgments (appeal 
for annulment) of the General Court 1990 – 2013 (total sample: 27 judgments) 
Economic term 
No. of judgments where 
it appeared 
Percentage (out of 27) 
monopoly 14 51,85% 
substitutability 9 33,33% 
supply and demand 8 29,63% 
efficiency (gains) 7 25,93% 
economies of scale 7 25,93% 
market power 5 18,52% 
barriers to entry 4 14,81% 
average variable costs 3 11,11% 
total costs 3 11,11% 
elasticity 2 7,41% 
incremental costs 2 7,41% 
SSNIP test 2 7,41% 
oligopoly 2 7,41% 
maximisation of profits 1 3,70% 
allocative efficiency  0 0,00% 
consumer welfare 0 0,00% 
market failure 0 0,00% 
marginal cost 0 0,00% 
The following chart shows that there is no apparent increase in the use of explicit 
economic terms in time. Two judgments which include most of the economic 
terms are even on the opposite sides of the time framework. The Tetra Pak II 
case from 1994 (T-83/91) and the Telefónica case from 2012 (T-336/07) are – at 
least formally – the most “economized” judgments of the General Court. The 
other judgments include only few economic terms, and this resistance to economic 
terminology seems constant over time. 
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6.1.2. Explicit economic terms in judgments of the Court of Justice in Art. 102 
TFEU cases 
For a simplistic comparison, let us look at a similar lexical analysis within 
judgments of the Court of Justice. At first sight, it is apparent that its approach 
to using explicitly economic terminology is weaker than the approach of the 
General Court. Very probably, it is due to different procedures and functions of 
both courts.  
Table 2: The presence of explicit economic terms in Art. 102 TFEU judgments of 
the Court of Justice, 1990 - 2013 (total sample: 44 judgments) 
Economic term 
No. of judgments 
where it appeared 
Percentage (out 
of 44) 
monopoly 18 40,91% 
efficiency 6 13,64% 
supply and demand 5 11,36% 
substitutability 4 9,09% 
average variable costs 4 9,09% 
total costs 4 9,09% 
economies of scale 2 4,55% 
barriers to entry 2 4,55% 
incremental costs 2 4,55% 
elasticity 1 2,27% 
oligopoly 1 2,27% 
consumer welfare 1 2,27% 
contestable/contestability 1 2,27% 
market power 0 0,00% 
SSNIP test 0 0,00% 
profit-maximization 0 0,00% 
marginal cost 0 0,00% 
 
The chart on the evolution of the use of economics in time shows almost the same 
pattern as in case of the GC judgments. The Court of Justice does not seem to 
change its attitude to economics in time. There are just two exceptionally cases 
on the opposite sides of the time spectrum: Tetra Pak from 1996 (C-333/94 P) and 
Post Danmark from 2012 (C-209/10). No particular difference could be found 
between appellate judgments and preliminary reference judgments.  
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 Chart n 2 : The number of explicit economic terms used in 102 judgments of the CJ 
6.1.3. Using statistical methods to evaluate the data 
What may be interesting is a correlation of the presence of certain economic 
terms in judgments. The correlation shows a relative linear dependence of two 
variables and does not imply causation. Here we also abandon the time aspect, 
and count with the whole dataset. The correlation coefficient (CC), which may 
take values from -1 (absolute negative dependence) to +1 (absolute positive 
dependence), shows the strength of a linear relation between two variables but 
does not explain the relation as such. 
Let us look on the relative dependence of the presence of terms “monopoly” and 
“barrier to entry” in the judgments of the General Court. Here, the correlation 
coefficient is 0.46 – it shows a moderate dependence between these two terms. In 
other words, when the court uses the term “monopoly”, it is moderately likely 
that the reasoning in the judgment would include also “barrier to entry”. A 
slightly higher dependence, CC = 0.52, may be seen between terms “monopoly” 
and “substitutability”. The CC of 0.61 in case of the relation between “efficiency” 
and “economies of scale” indicates that these two terms appear together 
relatively often. Typically, the Court admits that certain practices of 
undertakings can lead to economic advantages or gains in terms of efficiency and 
economies of scale.82   
                                            
82 Case T-57/01 Solvay [2009] ECR II-4621 [318]. Case T-203/01 Michelin II [2003] ECR II-4071 
[58]. 
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An interesting comparison may be seen within the reasoning of the Court of 
Justice. The correlation of “monopoly” and “barrier to entry” is very low, with the 
CC = 0.26. The same relation is between “monopoly” and “substitutability” (CC = 
0.22). In case of “efficiency” and “economies of scale” the result is even slightly 
below zero as CC = -0.09. Therefore, between the chosen variables, we cannot see 
any significant linear dependence. 
Let us look at the average presence of explicitly economic terms in judgments. 
The arithmetic average of the values describes just the mean value of the 
dataset and may be influenced by extreme values. On average, every judgment of 
the General Court includes 2.60 explicitly economic terms out of the list. The 
standard deviation is quite high, it equals to 2.50; and the variation is even 6.02. 
It shows quite big differences among judgments.  
The average result is much lower within the judgments of the Court of Justice 
where the average presence of explicitly economic terms is only 1.11. The 
standard deviation is 1.32 and variation is only 1.69 which shows that the 
differences among judgments are not very significant. 
6.1.4. Conclusion of the lexical analysis 
This lexical analysis of the presence of economics in competition judgments is 
quite superficial and shows only a formal reflection of the economic terminology 
in the legal reasoning of the Courts. Nevertheless, it shows that the Courts are 
quite unwilling to use more often purely economic terms and that their approach 
to mainstream economics in abuse of dominance cases is reserved. Moreover, 
there is no visible trend and its approach stays constant.  
The assessment through statistical tools shows that the use of economic 
terminology is rather random, and there are no considerable relations of using 
certain terms together.   
However, even if the lexical analysis shows a kind of deterrence of both Courts to 
the economic terminology, economics may be present in judgments in a more 
legal way. Therefore in the second step, it is necessary to examine how economics 
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is reflected in case law in a form of arguments which were translated from 
economics to legal parlance. The following part will assess in detail various 
anticompetitive practices and will look at how economics is pulled into law by the 
court within each type of the investigated behaviour. 
6.2. Development of economic reasoning in the CJEU  
The following section will analyse the appearance of economic arguments in 
judgments of the CJEU. It will outline the presumable development of using 
economic arguments within the reasoning and will focus on particular parts.  
The general framework is as it follows: The reasoning will be assessed according 
to the constitutive parts of the abuse of dominance, i.e. relevant market, 
dominant position and the anticompetitive conduct. Within the last category, only 
chosen types of abuses will be examined. Within each category, the analysis will 
go through judgments chronologically and it will trace down how economic 
arguments appear in judgments and how their presence evolves over time.  
As already mentioned, for a necessary simplification, economics is taken 
artificially as one variable, as one – even if internally heterogeneous – source of 
arguments. It is deliberately disregarded in which stream of though a certain 
argument has its basis, or where it was developed and by whom.  
Methodology 
Every category starts with an introduction and explanation of the economic 
rationale behind. It briefly elaborates on which effects a particular practice 
brings, what are the constitutive parts of each practice from the economic point of 
view and on which other aspects economics focuses. Consequently, it is followed 
by a thorough analysis on how this economic rationale was actually reflected 
within the legal reasoning of the CJEU, and it is compared where the legal 
approach differs from the economic one. 
The economic rationale and background are predominantly based on the current 
state of art of competition economics. The brief explanation is in majority 
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inspired by recent publications on law and economics in competition law,83 and 
where necessary it is accompanied by information stemming from older works or 
from pure economics. 
The case law in the respective field is scanned – either alongside the timeline 
(development), or according to some inner shapes and types of the behaviour. 
Within this scanning, it is analysed how the reasoning absorbs the economic 
consideration and how it developed in time. The focus is on where and when the 
courts add new economic elements into their reasoning (either into the normative 
statements or as supportive economic explanations) and how the reasoning 
evolved in terms of enriching argumentation by novelties.  
The aim of this chapter is to make a rather neutral assessment and reflection on 
the use of economics. However, normative remarks on the quality of the 
reasoning are sometimes unavoidable. Therefore, in some parts, comments and 
critics of different authors are mentioned in order to see whether there is still a 
gap between the actual way of reasoning and the desirable picture of 
commentators.  
At the end, the economic reasoning of all practices will be compared and 
evaluated with a conclusion how the economic reasoning of courts developed in 
time and what are the most significant patterns of this evolution. 
Framework 
Within this chapter, both the European courts, CJ and GC, are taken together, 
and not separately. This approach is based on the assumption that both courts 
behave in the same manner, and that the development does not go alongside the 
specific task or position of each court, but it is rather a process which jumps from 
one court to the other one and vice versa and does not differ between judicial 
                                            
83 Mainly the following ones: Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of 
Article 102 TFEU (Second Edition, Hart Publishing 2013). Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit (n 5). 
Hildebrand (n 5). Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins and James Kavanagh, Economics for Competition 
Lawyers (Oxford University Press 2011). Simon Bishop, The Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2010). Van den Bergh and 
Camesasca (n 18). Louis Kaplow and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust’ in A Mitchell Polinsky and Steven 
Shavell (eds), Handbook of Law and Economics. Volume 2 (North-Holland 2007). 
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review cases and preliminary references. Concerning time framework, judgments 
from the very beginning till nowadays will be examined. 
The analysis is divided into more sub-chapters according to the normative 
features of the abuse in the following way: (1) relevant market, (2) dominant 
position, and concrete abusive practices – (3) predatory pricing, (4) margin 
squeeze, (5) refusal to supply, (6) tying and bundling, and (7) fidelity rebates. 
6.2.1. Relevant market 
What does “market” mean? Economics defines it simply as a place where demand 
meets supply. For the needs of competition law, it is, however, essential to 
delimitate more concretely how this place where two economic forces meet each 
other look like and how big it is. 
The European courts have consistently ruled from the outset that the proper 
definition of the relevant market is of the utmost importance as the first step in 
the examination of the dominant position.84 Already in Continental Can, the 
landmark decision, the CJ held that “the definition of the relevant market is of 
essential significance” because competition may be assessed solely “in relation to 
those characteristics of the products in question by virtue of which those products 
are particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a limited extent 
interchangeable with other products.”85 In this case, the CJ highlighted the 
importance of the market definition from the economic perspective, taking 
account mainly the elasticity of demand of a product/service in question and the 
substitutability of the product which has a major influence on the limitation on 
the market.  
The necessity to start with the relevant market definition is, rather from the 
legal point of view, further developed in the judgment of the GC in Volkswagen, 
where the court explained the logical chain of analysis in the following way: 
“[B]efore an abuse of a dominant position is ascertained, it is necessary to 
                                            
84 See, among others, Case 6/72 Continental Can (n 57) [32]. Case 27/76 United Brands [1978] 
ECR 207 [10]. Case T-219/99 British Airways plc v Commission (n 72) [91].  
85 Case 6/72 Continental Can (n 57) [32]. 
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establish the existence of a dominant position in a given market, which 
presupposes that such a market has already been defined.”86 The rationale 
remains the same, saying that the market definition is the inevitable 
precondition for further steps of the investigation.  
The definition of the relevant market directly influences the finding whether the 
investigated undertaking holds a dominant position or not. Moreover, the 
delimitation of the market has an impact on the assessment of the actual or 
potential effects of the practice in question. There are two opposite risks 
connected to an incorrect market definition. On one hand, if the relevant market 
is defined too broadly, the dominant position of the undertaking is melted, and 
the practice escapes the competition law viewfinder. On the other hand, if the 
definition is too narrow, it leads to the undue finding of the dominance and the 
misinterpretation of effects.  
Economics behind the concept of relevant market 
Within the sphere of relevant market, first, economics provides for the 
interpretation of the relevant market as a concept, and second, it also offers tools 
(proxies) how to assess it. From the point of view of economics, the concept of 
relevant market is a core of all economic assumptions. One can perform economic 
analysis and assess a conduct only on the basis of an assumption of the existence 
of a particular market which is examined.  
Based on the starting assumption of the existence of relevant market, economics 
further explains how to find out that there is one. In doing so, it uses the 
following proxies. The borders of the relevant market are usually drawn 
alongside three elements: (1) the product and its inner characteristics, (2) 
consumers who buy the product and their habits, and (3) the territory where the 
consumers purchase the product. In practice, the first and the second element are 
taken together and thus lead to the definition of the relevant product market, 
while the third category defines the relevant geographic market.  
                                            
86 Case T-62/98 Volkswagen [2000] ECR II-2707 [230]. 
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The complex economic concepts are already simplified into guidelines87 included 
in the Commission’s Notice on the Market Definition from 1997. According to it, 
the product market is delimitated by “all those products and/or services which 
are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”88 The geographic 
market is then defined as “the area in which the undertakings concerned are 
involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the 
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be 
distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those area.”89 The definition of the relevant market for 
the aims of competition law enforcement must be established “by the combination 
of the product and geographic markets.“90 
Regarding, first, the relevant product market, it is based on two elements: 
demand-side substitution and supply-side substitution.  
The demand-side substitution reflects the willingness of consumers to switch 
among products which are, in their view, interchangeable as they can serve to the 
same consumption aims. The inner characteristics of the product are not 
important, what matters are the preferences and the view of consumers.91 The 
higher the demand-side substitution is, the more risky is to raise prices, because 
customers would switch to a competing product, and therefore it broadens the 
size of the relevant market.  
The supply-side substitution then describes the ability of competitors to change 
their production and smoothly adapt to the demand of the relevant product. The 
preparedness of other producers to react quickly and to start selling a similar 
                                            
87 See an article by E. Fox who highlights the influence of economists on creation of soft law 
documents: Fox, ‘When Economists Are Kings’ (n 38). 
88 Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community 
Competition Law 1997 (OJ 1997 C372/5) para 7. 
89 Ibid 8. 
90 Ibid 9. 
91 Typically, this is due to marketing and market segmentation that consumers perceive products 
which are physically very similar and therefore interchangeable, as completely different goods; 
e.g. a shampoo for women v. a shampoo for men. 
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product (without bearing high additional costs) enlarges the relevant product 
market because it creates an immediate potential substitutability.92  
Moreover, economics predicts the occurrence and relevance of so-called chains of 
substitution. The theory accepts even indirect substitutes to be a part of one 
relevant market if they are mutually interconnected due to chains of 
substitution. Even if there are two products which are not direct substitutes, the 
existence of a third product which is deemed to be a substitute for both two, links 
all products to be comprised into the same relevant market because the 
respective pricing of the first two products is constrained by the possibility to 
switch for the third one.93 
Next to assessing the pure substitutability, economics offers also other more 
complex tools to measure the relevant market, such as the so-called hypothetical 
monopolist test (hereinafter the “HMT”). It serves as an analytical tool to assess 
substitutability of products in the following way. Having its roots, in the US 
merger policy, the HMT is used to identify the narrowest market where a 
hypothetical profit-maximizing firm would be able to exercise its market power 
by imposing at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price 
(“SSNIP”; hypothetical price increase).94 The Commission Market Definition 
Notice explains the steps as “starting from the type of products that the 
undertakings involved sell and the area in which they sell them, additional 
products and areas will be included in, or excluded from, the market definition 
depending on whether competition from these other products and areas affect or 
restrain sufficiently the pricing of the parties' products in the short term.“95 
Under the HMT, a so-called SSNIP test is used as a quantitative method to 
measure the substitutability. According to the Market Definition Notice, the 
                                            
92 However, the immediate potential substitutability is different from potential competition which 
presents a possibility that new competitors enter the market in the long run and while bearing 
high costs. See Market Definition Notice 1997 (n 88) para 24. 
93 Ibid 57. For more detailed explanation and examples see O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 106–
107. Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit (n 5) 181–182. 
94 US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010 s 
4.1.1. 
95 Market Definition Notice 1997 (n 88) para 16. 
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small increase is supposed to be in the range from 5% to 10%.96 However, it is 
sometimes criticised for making false conclusions (so-called cellophane fallacy97). 
Next to these and possibly other quantitative methods,98 economics allows even 
for qualitative approach, such as the physical characteristics of the product and 
the intended use by consumers. The method relies on preferences of consumers 
therefore the results are only approximate, and it raises a risk that the 
conclusion is based on subjective considerations with no proper analysis of the 
behaviour of consumers and their actual consuming attitude.  
As far as the geographic market is concerned, the economic view how to shape it 
is analogous to the product market definition. It works both with demand-side 
substitution and supply-side substitution. The demand-side substitution shows 
how far (in terms of real physical distance) the customers are willing to move in 
order to purchase a product, if the price of the relevant product increases. The 
economic factors which influence the geographic scope of the market include 
transport costs, durability of the product (customers are willing to travel more to 
purchase a more durable product in comparison to a product of the daily use), the 
physical nature of the product (there are almost no barriers e.g. for software in 
comparison to large and heavy movable goods), transport facilities, quality of 
distributional channels, administrative burdens, etc. 
The supply-side substitution is influenced by obstacles that producers face when 
they want to adapt to the demand, or when they want to enlarge the territory 
they supply. These obstacles are physical limits, transportation costs, 
administrative burdens, costs stemming from necessary investment, contractual 
limits, capacity constraints, etc.  
Moreover, the geographic delimitation of the market depends also on 
homogeneity of conditions and consumer preferences stemming from cultural 
                                            
96 Ibid 17. 
97 This failure of the SSNIP test is called after the case United States v E.I. Du Pont de Nemours 
and Col, 351 US 377 (1956). The market of cellophane was wrongly claimed not to be a separate 
market because of a considerable cross-price elasticity of demand vis-a-vis other materials. 
98 E.g. critical loss analysis, price correlations, co-integration analysis etc. – see in more detail 
O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 116–119. Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit (n 5) 182–186. 
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background. If differences in conditions are remarkable, it makes a barrier of 
market power and creates a separate market. As an example, the borders may be 
drawn alongside a national frontier when the condition lies in national tastes or 
habits. It may also follow borders of linguistic territories when a product in case 
is intrinsically connected with a language (e.g. books, newspapers).  
Overall, economics offers quantitative as well as qualitative criteria which could 
serve as proxies when delimitating the relevant market in a particular case. In 
reality, the actual definition is quite sensitive because a wrong finding may lead 
either to under-enforcement, or over-enforcement. 
The reflection in legal reasoning 
Using words of Thomas Kauper, “market definition is a process dominated by 
economists who shape lawyers' arguments and engage in testimonial battles in 
court.“99 Following his argument, one could easily claim that market definition 
comes into legal reasoning as a ready-made product which requires from lawyers 
only to fulfil it with necessary factual evidence and not to examine its normative 
nature. However, even if it may appear at first sight that legal reasoning accepts 
the economic approach as such, the normative intervention of the court is 
necessary, at least just to approve the suggestions of economists to become a legal 
standard.  
In any event, it is apparent from the early case law, that the CJEU was initially 
reluctant to pull more detailed and technical arguments into its reasoning and 
relied upon rather qualitative and often presumption-like arguments. The 
willingness to almost accept the ready-made economic product based on economic 
and econometric data appeared much later. 
It is interesting that in early cases, the CJEU did not examine in such a detail 
the economic nature of the demand-side substitutability, but on the other hand, 
                                            
99 Thomas E Kauper, ‘The Problem of Market Definition Under EC Competition Law’ (1996) 20 
Fordham International Law Journal 1682, 1682. However, it should be mentioned that Kauper 
refers here to U.S. antitrust law.  
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the supply-side substitutability was assessed more or less in accordance with the 
economic view.  
Concerning the demand-side substitutability, it is apparent from the early 
judgments that the CJEU gave precedence to the qualitative aspects of the 
substitutability. In the case United Brands, the CJEU followed the Commission’s 
approach taking into account the inner characteristics of the product (bananas) 
and its probable perception in the eyes of consumers. Starting with the objective 
findings that bananas are soft and do not include seeds which distinguish them 
from other fruits, the Court automatically jumped into a rather subjective 
presumption that due to this characteristics they have no proper substitutes.100  
It did not take into consideration the actual ability of the undertaking to 
influence prices, nor did it look at possible quantitative tools, such as price 
elasticity, differences between prices etc. 
Such an early approach succumbed to huge criticism which blamed it for being 
result-oriented and presenting a reverse logic: the market was defined in such a 
breadth to comply with the findings of the dominant position.101  
Even a decade later, the Hilti judgment was based on the argument highlighting 
the “qualitative characteristics of the products at issue,”102 the way they are 
produced and a presumption-like use by customers. The GC found that there are 
three separate relevant markets in question for nail guns, cartridge strips and 
nails because “cartridge strips and nails are specifically manufactures, and 
purchased by users, for a single brand of gun.”103 The GC even did not change its 
view when facing expert economic surveys and econometric analyses.104 The 
findings were criticised for defining a too narrow market, not to taking into 
consideration the price changes of other fastening systems than nail guns.105 
                                            
100 Case 27/76 United Brands (n 84) [12–35].  
101 Kauper (n 99) 303. 
102 Case T-30/89 Hilti [1991] ECR II-1439 [72]. 
103 Ibid 66. 
104 Ibid 75–76. 
105 See the critique in detail, eg. in Kauper (n 99) 1682–1767.  
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In Wanadoo, both the GC and the CJ accepted the concept of demand-side 
substitution by upholding the Commission’s analysis. The question which arose 
within the case was whether the supply of broadband access (high-speed access) 
to the internet is a part of the same relevant market as narrowband access and 
cable access (low-speed access). Based on the SSNIP test, it was found that the 
substitutability between these two groups of services is “extremely asymmetrical” 
with an enormous shift of consumers towards high-speed access despite price 
differences.106 The GC also accepted the conclusion of the SSNIP test provided by 
the Commission Notice, saying that the “high percentage of subscribers who 
would not abandon high-speed access in response to a price increase of 5 to 10% 
provides a strong indication of the absence of demand-side substitution.”107 
The Wanadoo case seems as a shift from the qualitative approach to the 
quantitative one. However, the courts are not willing to quit the qualitative 
analysis at all, since it still presents a reliable guide for them even in high-tech or 
financial industries. So in Microsoft, the market for media players which allowed 
for streaming was deemed distinct from a market of media players without 
streaming functions. The difference was based just on the functionality of both 
products.108 In ClearStream, the GC looked at the demand-side substitutability 
through the presumed preferences of consumers who make differences between 
offered services just because of their diverse characteristics.109  
The reliance also on qualitative analysis is not, however, a step back. Even 
economists approve, that both approaches are desirably complementary, 
especially in cases where there is a lack of quantitative evidence. It is claimed 
that “qualitative data are most likely to be used in future as a cross-check on 
quantitative data, which would be preferable to reliance on qualitative data 
only.”110 
                                            
106 Case T-340/03 France Télécom (Wanadoo) [2007] ECR II-107 [88–89]. 
107 Ibid 90. 
108 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 [914]. 
109 Case T-301/04 Clearstream [2009] ECR II-3155 [51–57]. 
110 O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 120. 
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Regarding the supply-side substitutability, the CJEU was more ambitious even 
in early judgments. In the seminal judgment in Continental Can, the CJEU 
quashed the Commission’s findings on relevant markets because it neglected the 
supply-side substitutability. The CJEU claimed that “[a] dominant position on 
the market [...] cannot be decisive, as long as it has not been proved that 
competitors from other sectors [...] are not in a position to enter this market, by a 
simple adaptation, with sufficient strength to create a serious counterweight.”111 
Similarly, in Michelin, the CJEU used the same logic and this time approved the 
Commission’s findings of separate relevant markets. It made a statement that 
there was no elasticity of supply because a modification of production would 
require time and significant costs into investment.112 
In Kish Glass, the GC based its findings on the qualitative analysis of production 
claiming that the production of different products requires the same technology. 
Thus the change for a production of another product bears no additional costs for 
the undertaking.113 
Concerning the geographic market, the Courts focused predominantly on 
transport costs and logistics in general. In United Brands, transport costs were 
not deemed as a barrier.114 The same approach was taken in the Hilti case where 
the Court made an assumption stemming from low transport costs that price 
differences between Member States would enable parallel trade and would lead 
to price arbitrage.115 In Aéroport de Paris, the focus was on barriers to entry.116 
The similar approach was kept in Microsoft I when the GC identified a global 
world-wide market because of no import restrictions and very low transport 
costs.117  
                                            
111 Case 6/72 Continental Can (n 57) [33].   
112 Case 322/81 Michelin I [1983] ECR 3461 [41]. 
113 Case T-65/96 Kish Glass [2000] ECR II-1885 [68]. Upheld by the CJ in C-241/00 P, Kish Glass 
[2001] ECR I-07759.   
114 Case 27/76 United Brands (n 84) [228]. 
115 Case T-30/89 Hilti (n 102) [81]. 
116 Case T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris [2000] ECR II-3929 [141–143]. 
117 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission (n 108) [1095]. 
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Summary and assessment 
When it comes to demand-side substitutability as a proxy for delimitating a 
product market, the CJEU has developed its approach considerably. Starting 
with pure qualitative and rather subjective assessment in United Brands, it was 
gradually able to accept new approaches and to use quantitative measures as 
well. It is presumably due to the Commission Notice which specified how relevant 
market should be defined and how quantitative data should be used and the 
CJEU then followed the Commission’s direction. 
The supply-side substitutability was, even in early cases, assessed in compliance 
with economic considerations. The focus was devoted mainly to qualitative data, 
but in line with what economics offers. Also the geographic market definition has 
been assessed in more or less the same way from the very beginning. The CJEU 
relies upon both quantitative and qualitative indicators.   
Nevertheless, the product market definition still highly depends on demand-side 
substitutability and its understanding and application by the CJEU is crucial. 
The development of the approach of the CJEU is therefore is the most important 
change in its practice. There is a visible change in the attitude in 1990s initiated 
by the Commission. Consequently, the CJEU was able to approve its suggestions 
and to assess relevant market in accordance with current economic suggestions.  
6.2.2. Dominant position 
The second step of the analysis requires a determination of the dominant position 
on the market in question. From the legal point of view, without identifying 
dominance first, it is not possible to investigate abusive practices under article 
102 TFEU. The treaty itself, however, does not provide for a definition of the 
dominance which opens a door for a clarification of the content based on 
economics. 
Economic rationale of the dominant position 
Simply said, the role of economics within the aspect of dominance is two-fold. 
First, economics provide for a closer definition of the dominant position 
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(theoretically, in abstracto). Second, it offers tools how to measure the dominance 
in concrete cases.  
As to the first part, economics considers dominance on the market as a reflection 
of market power which is defined as the capability of an undertaking to charge 
prices above its marginal costs.118 More broadly, economics sees dominance in 
cases where the market power enables the undertaking either to charge 
supracompetitive prices (prices above the competitive level), or to limit the output 
under the competitive level. Market power may have influence not only on prices 
and quantities, but also on other aspects of competition, such as quality of goods, 
the variety of the assortment connected to the width of consumers’ choice, 
innovation in the long run etc. 
Therefore economics sees significant market power not only if the undertaking is 
able to behave considerably independently of its competitors and customers, but 
also in all cases where it is able to charge supracompetitive prices. It is for 
example a case of oligopolistic market, where the prices are considerably above 
the level of economic optimum even if the undertakings take into account the 
position of their competitors on one side, and are limited by the response of 
consumers, on the other side. 
Economic theory counts with dominance also in cases where there is one strong 
undertaking which competes with a fringe of small competitors. Due to its 
position, the strong undertaking is able to set prices (it is a price-maker), and the 
small rivals have to adapt and be price-takers. 
Second, the role of economics related to the concept of dominance is even stronger 
when it comes to the issue of the assessment of a concrete dominant position. In 
that sense, economics provides for tools for measuring market power, and 
consequently concluding on dominance in concreto. Even according to economics, 
there is no clear and definite tool to measure market power. It is thus necessary 
to work with proxies.  
                                            
118 See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 
2004) 115. 
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The first tool that economics provides is elasticity of demand. It explains the 
sensitivity of purchasers to price changes.119 However, elasticity of demand is 
rather a theoretical concept, and it is not always possible to measure it precisely 
in reality. Therefore the most practical tool to work with is a proxy in the form of 
market shares. According to economics, a market share represents a ratio of the 
undertaking’s revenues over the revenues of all undertakings within the same 
market. Alternatively, market share can be calculated in terms of sold units.120  
Neither market shares have an absolute and ultimate informative value for the 
assessment of market power and need to be complemented by additional tools. 
According to Landes and Posner, using solely market shares to measure market 
power may be misleading because such an approach ignores the conditions of the 
market which may have a strong influence on the market power.121 They thus 
suggested using a combination of market shares and other factors, elasticity of 
demand and elasticity of supply.122  
The current approach of competition authorities is more or less in line with this 
argument. Market shares are taken as the first benchmark and consequently 
they are complemented by other factors. In reality, it is not only the power to 
charge supracompetitive prices, but also the strength to exclude actual or 
potential rivals.  
The reflection in legal reasoning 
It stems from the above that economics both defines the concept of dominance 
quite precisely, and offers a rich variety of tools to be used for measuring it – 
although they are in a form of proxies. While economics focuses on market power, 
law works with the term “dominance” which embodies in fact the economic 
concept of market power, but is more dynamic. 
                                            
119 Dennis W Carlton, Modern Industrial Organization (3rd ed, Addison-Wesley 2000) 65–66. 
120 Massimo Motta claims that the revenue-based market share has a greater informational value 
from the economic point of view, but the volume-based market share may be of relevance as well 
because it may reveal additional features of the market position of the undertaking. See Motta (n 
118) 119. 
121 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’ (1981) 94 
Harvard Law Review 937, 947. 
122 Ibid 944–963. 
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Quite conversely to the detailed and precise approach of economics, the legal 
perception by courts seems rather simplistic. The courts pick up only some 
variables which are then turned into the legalistic view on the dominance. 
Analogously to the economic view, legal reasoning must work with the definition 
of dominance and with tools for its measurement. 
The classical legal standard, as it was developed already in 1970s, says that the 
dominant position requires (a) a certain economic strength of the undertaking 
leading to (b) a possibility of an independent behaviour of this undertaking which 
(c) may prevent competition on the relevant market. Such an undertaking is 
independent not only on other competitors, but also on its customers and 
consumers in general.123  However, the economic strength may not necessarily 
preclude competition but rather it gives the undertaking a power to influence “the 
conditions under which that competition will develop, and in any case to act 
largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its 
detriment.”124 
Some authors claim that the two consequences under points (b) and (c) in fact 
describe one and the same aspect.125 From the economic view, both the possibility 
of an independent behaviour and the possibility to prevent competition present 
one economic phenomenon and it is the ability to charge supracompetitive prices 
and/or to reduce output. However, as it was already claimed above, the ability to 
charge supracompetitive prices may occur even in cases when the undertaking 
does not behave absolutely independently on its rivals. In that sense, the legal 
test does not reflect the economic rationale precisely since it stipulates the 
condition for the dominance more narrowly than economics sets for market 
power. 
Within the basic definition, the legal test works with two essential elements from 
economics: the market power and the ability to charge supracompetitive prices. 
The latter one, however, is translated into legal reasoning in a less precise 
                                            
123 Case 27/76 United Brands (n 84) [207]. Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche (1979] ECR 461 [461]. 
Case 322/81 Michelin I (n 112) [30]. 
124 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 123) [39]. Case 27/76 United Brands (n 84) [113]. 
125 Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit (n 5) 186. 
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manner which raises questions and doubts. The legal test is then completed by 
additional arguments which try to clarify the circumstances and consequences of 
the market power. Nevertheless, they just elaborate on the very same argument 
and do not change the rationale.  
If we compare the legal standard created by the CJEU with the economic 
definition presented above, it is apparent that the legal test lacks other features 
which may be of importance from the economic point of view.  By focusing on 
independence of the undertaking, the CJEU neglects the actual ability to raise 
prices or limit output.       
In 1990s, the CJEU added several clarifications such as that “the existence of a 
dominant position derives from a combination of several factors which, taken 
separately, are not necessarily decisive.”126 
In order to assess the dominance more precisely, the Courts (and the Commission 
as well) started to use proxies. The existence of such an economic strength is 
predominantly based on presumption on market shares. A very high portion of 
the market pie is deemed as evidence of the existence of a dominant position and 
could be rebutted only in exceptional circumstances.127 This statement has still 
been valid since the early case law and the courts have not changed the approach 
considerably.  
The early case law was reflected in Commission Guidance Paper from which it 
stems that market shares should be used only as the first, but not the decisive 
tool. Therefore barriers of entry128 are analysed immediately after and other 
conditions are taken into account as well.  
The reliance on market shares in the first place shows a kind of legal 
presumption based on economic facts. In other words, it is a legal construction 
supported by economics which enables to define a limit where it is necessary to 
assess the facts more profoundly in order to prove the dominant position, and 
                                            
126 Case C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim [1994] ECR I-5641 [47].  
127 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 123) [41]. Case T-30/89 Hilti (n 102) [90]. 
128 Case 27/76 United Brands (n 84) [122]. 
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where the dominant position is taken as proved unless exceptional circumstances 
prove the opposite. Such a standard clearly translated the economic rationale 
behind that a monopoly, almost-monopoly or quasi-monopoly undertaking – a 
dominant undertaking in legal parlance – has the ability to behave as a price-
maker, i.e. to set prices and/or limit quantity of the output without being limited 
by the market conditions. In economic theory, such a position leads to decrease of 
the total welfare, consumer welfare and causes deadweight losses which are to 
the detriment of the economy in global. In majority of cases, the CJEU settles for 
the mere repetition of the legal standard, and concludes that the dominance was 
proved thanks to high market shares. 
Sometimes, the reasoning is completed with an economic explanation such as in 
the Hilti case, where the GC reminds us that the dominant position of the 
undertaking on the markets was “enhanced by the patents which it held at the 
time on certain elements of its DX 450 nail gun,” and then the GC explains that 
“it is highly improbable in practice that a non-dominant supplier will act as Hilti 
did, since effective competition will normally ensure that the adverse consequences 
of such behaviour outweigh any benefits.”129 
In case of so-called “statutory monopoly” or “legal monopoly” the GC does not go 
into detailed analysis. In case of statutory monopoly, the dominance is presumed 
due to the “economic dependence on the supplier” and cannot be denied “even if 
the services provided under a monopoly are linked to a product which is itself in 
competition with other products.”130 Thanks to a legal monopoly, the undertaking 
“wields economic power which enables it to prevent effective competition from 
being maintained in the relevant market by giving it the opportunity to act 
independently.”131 
The GC also takes into account the temporal aspect and insists that the high 
market shares must be held “for some time”132, “throughout the period in 
                                            
129 Case T-30/89 Hilti (n 102) [93]. 
130 Case T-229/94 Deutsche Bahn [1997] ECR II-1689 [57–58]. 
131 Case T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris (n 116) [150]. 
132 Case T-139/98 AAMS [2001] ECR II-0000 [51]. 
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question”133, “during relatively long periods”134 etc end denies that a decline in 
market shares which are still large could mean the absence of a dominant 
position.135 
As far as concrete numbers are concerned, the Court of Justice has stated that a 
“market share of 70 – 80% is, in itself, a clear indication of the existence of a 
dominant position”136, and even a “market share of 50% constitutes in itself, save 
in exceptional circumstances, a dominant position”.137 Regarding possible contra 
arguments, the Court consistently denies the argument that the existence of lively 
competition on a particular market [could] rule out the possibility that there is a 
dominant position on that market.”138 
Summary and assessment 
It is apparent from the rulings that the definition of dominance made by the 
CJEU stays constant and rigid. The abstract statements used in judgments are 
predominantly based on settled case law, and the development in the definition of 
criteria is not very remarkable. The economics is translated into a legal standard 
more or less in the same way. 
The CJEU started with a simple legal standard and later it added some 
complementary economic explanations. Together with the Commission, they use 
proxies in a form in market shares as first indicators, and examine other 
characteristics of the undertaking and the market in the second place.  
In any event, the main criterion is still valid: dominance is assessed based on the 
“ability” to influence the market, to behave relatively independently on the 
market. The detailed criteria, how to assess the ability, must be taken from 
                                            
133 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II (n 40) [109]. 
134 Case T-139/98 AAMS (n 132) [57]. Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 123) [41]. 
135 Joined Cases T-24/93 to T-26/93 and T-28/93 Compagnie Maritime Belge [1996] ECR II-1201 
[7]. 
136 Case T-30/89 Hilti (n 102) [92]. Case T-66/01 ICI [2010] ECR II-000 [257]. Case T-336/07 
Telefónica [2012] nyr [150]. 
137 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie (n 42) [60]. Case T-66/01 ICI (n 136) [256]. 
138 Case T-336/07 Telefónica (n 136) [162]. 
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economics, and the CJEU leaves an open space how to make it for each particular 
case.  
Overall, the approach of the CJEU stays rigid. Once created standard based on 
economic assumptions is still being repeated, and in majority of cases, the 
assessment of the dominance relies upon the market shares. 
6.2.3. Predatory pricing 
The goal of the prohibition of predatory pricing is to prevent economically strong 
undertakings from using their market power to get rid of weaker competitors and 
eventually from causing harm to consumers.  
Predatory pricing practices present cases where economics is presumably much 
more included than in other types of behaviour, because the core of the problem 
lies in comparing costs and prices. Therefore the output of the ruling is 
considerably dependent on the settings about which costs and which prices 
should be taken into consideration when evaluating an alleged anticompetitive 
behaviour and how they should be compared. In concrete cases, the ruling 
depends on findings how the costs and prices were counted and what their 
mutual relation was.  
Economic background of the predatory pricing 
From the economic perspective, 139 the predatory pricing practice is easy to be 
explained. It presents a situation where the undertaking plans to go through two 
stages: first, the undertaking gives out a certain part of a possible profit by 
pricing below a normally profitable threshold with the aim to gain more 
customers and therefore to push other competitors to quit the market or to 
prevent other potential competitors from entering the market. Once some 
competitors leave the market or are foreclosed to enter it, the competition is 
weakened, and the undertaking may go into the second stage, where it increases 
the prices to the level enabling to recuperate the incurred loss.  
                                            
139 Economic theory in more detail in Kaplow and Shapiro (n 83) 1195–1196. 
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The first-stage loss is considered to be a kind of investment which is turned into a 
higher profit in the second stage where the competition is reduced. In other 
words, economics focuses on four aspects of the practice: (1) deliberately incurred 
loss in the first stage, (2) elimination of competitors as the outcome of the first 
stage, (3) increase in prices in the second stage, (4) recoupment of the initial loss 
as the result of the second stage.140 
Even if there are sceptical opinions of economists about the plausibility of the 
recoupment and therefore about the harm caused by predation,141 the 
mainstream economic approach agrees upon the anti-competitiveness of the 
above explained economic scenario.142  The standard economic test, setting in 
detail when a particular pricing is predatory, was suggested by American 
economists Areeda and Turner already in 1975.143 The test is based solely on 
comparison of costs and prices and according to it, pricing should be deemed 
predatory when prices are under average variable costs of the dominant 
undertaking.144 
Reflection in legal reasoning 
How this economic rationale is translated into legal reasoning can be seen in the 
landmark decision of this field - in the AKZO judgment of the Court of Justice. In 
this case, the Court pronounced the essential legal standards based on economic 
principles which are then being repeated in the consequent predatory pricing 
case law. The economic statement of normative nature says: “Prices below 
average variable costs (that is to say, those which vary depending on the 
                                            
140 See, slightly differently, in Patrick Rey, ‘Abuses of Dominant Position and Monopolization: An 
Economic Perspective’ in Abel M Mateus and Teresa Moreira (eds), Competition Law and 
Economics. Advances in Competition Policy Enforcement in the EU and North America (Edward 
Elgar 2010) 195–196. or O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 301. 
141 Robert H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (Basic Books 1978) 148–155. 
Frank H Easterbrook, ‘Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies’ (1981) 48 University of 
Chicago Law Review 263. 
142 Discussion on the empirical evidence of predatory pricing see Kaplow and Shapiro (n 83) 1196–
1197. Explanation through the lenses of game theory e.g. in Louis Phlips, Competition Policy: A 
Game-Theoretic Perspective (Cambridge Universtiy Press 1995).  
143 Phillip Areeda and Donald F Turner, ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 697. Critical response by Oliver E 
Williamson, ‘Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis’ (1977) 87 The Yale Law 
Journal 284. 
144 Areeda and Turner (n 143) 716–718. 
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quantities produced) by means of which a dominant undertaking seeks to 
eliminate a competitor must be regarded as abusive.”145 
The Court translates the economic scenario into a legal scenario in the way which 
emphasises two elements. First, the undertaking sets prices below certain (here: 
average variable) costs, and second, such a practice leads to reduction of 
competition. The Court disregards the other two economically relevant elements 
(increase in prices and recoupment of loss) and jumps directly into a presumption 
explaining that “[a] dominant undertaking has no interest in applying such prices 
except that of eliminating competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its 
prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position since each sale generates a 
loss, namely the total amount of the fixed costs (that is to say, those which remain 
constant regardless of the quantities produced) and, at least, part of the variable 
costs relating to the unit produced.”146 It is an economic explanation of the intent 
in the form of a presumption. It is one of the very economic arguments the courts 
express, using purely economic terms (average variable costs, monopolistic 
position, loss, fixed costs and costs relating to the unit produced). In Tetra Pak II, 
the General Court comes with a more detailed economic explanation that “the 
existence of gross or semi-gross margins obtained by subtracting from the sale 
price the variable direct costs or the average variable costs, being the costs relating 
to the unit produced which are negative suggests that a pricing practice is 
eliminatory.“147  
If the prices are above average variable costs, but below average total costs, the 
legal test requires an additional element in order to regard the practice as 
abusive: the intent to eliminate a competitor. The Court goes even above the 
Areeda/Turner economic test (above the threshold of AVC) and explains that 
“[s]uch prices can drive from the market undertakings which are perhaps as 
efficient as the dominant undertaking but which, because of their smaller 
financial resources, are incapable of withstanding the competition waged against 
                                            
145 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie (n 42) [71]. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II (n 40) [148]. 
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them.”148 The legal test based on economics is followed by an economic 
explanation of the consequences of such a conduct. Here, the presumption of the 
abusive nature of the conduct is abandoned and it is required to prove the 
anticompetitive intent of the undertaking. The construction of the argument is 
therefore based on two economically relevant aspects: (1) intentionally incurred 
loss, and (2) elimination of competitors. The latter one, however, does not need to 
be proven as a result. From the legal point of view, it is sufficient to prove the 
intent to bring about such a consequence. In order to prove the intent, the Court 
of Justice highlights that the time of intentionally incurring loss should be taken 
into consideration.149 
The legal approach of the courts combines a part of the purely economic test 
(cost/price analysis; prices below a certain threshold) with a rather legal test. In 
first case (prices are below average variable costs), the Court counts with a legal 
presumption derived from economic explanations. In the latter one (prices are 
above average variable costs but below average total costs), the Courts requires 
the anticompetitive intent to be proven. 
It is interesting to see the comparison with the U.S. approach to predatory 
pricing. The American courts include one more economic element into the legal 
test. In addition to the pricing below certain level of costs and the intent to 
eliminate competitors, it is necessary to prove the likelihood of the second stage, 
i.e. the likelihood that the dominant undertaking will ultimately recoup its 
interim losses.150 The American approach thus highlights the logic that there can 
be no consumer harm when the recoupment is impossible.151 The European 
reasoning, on the other hand, does not require anything additional as it is based 
on simple economic explanations and presumptions that intentionally incurred 
losses cannot reflect any economic rationale other than ousting competitors.152  
                                            
148 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie (n 42) [72]. 
149 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II (n 40) [149]. Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie (n 42) [72, 140, 146]. 
150 Case Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
151 More about the U.S. approach in Kaplow and Shapiro (n 83) 1201–1202. 
152 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II (n 40) [189]. 
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Such an approach was, interestingly, criticised by AG Mazák within the appeal 
procedure of Wanadoo France case where he called for the recoupment to be an 
essential requirement in a predatory pricing case.153 However, the Court of 
Justice did not follow Mazák’s suggestion and kept the use of traditional AKZO 
rules.154 
In accordance with this logic, the GC adds an economic explanation to rebut 
France Télécom’s argument in the case Wanadoo France. It is claimed that the 
below-cost pricing is justified by economies of scale and learning effects. However, 
the Court rejects this argument because of a simple economic reason: economies 
of scale and learning effects are, in the given case, just a consequence of 
predatory pricing and therefore cannot exempt the undertaking from liability.155  
As far as factual findings of each particular case are concerned, the Court sets 
guidelines for the Commission how to work with costs and prices. In AKZO, first, 
the Court confirms the Commission’s approach that only costs and prices of the 
dominant undertaking should be taken into account and cost structures and 
pricing policies of other competitors shall be disregarded.156 In that sense, the 
Court does not follow suggestions of AG Lenz who argues that in order to see the 
“reliable picture of the price level”, it is “necessary to analyse the cost structure of 
all three oligopolists.”157  
Second, it reminds us that the term cost cannot be considered as fixed or variable 
by nature but it shall be determined always according to real costs in relation to 
the quantities produced.158  It is an explanation of the economic rationale behind: 
variable costs are those costs which vary depending on the production volume, 
while fixed costs are constant regardless the changes in the output.  
This definition is valid, however, only in the short run. Economic theory 
presumes that in the long run (long period), all costs are variable, as the 
                                            
153 Opinion of AG Mazak in Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom (Wanadoo) [2009] I-02369 [68–78]. 
154 Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom (Wanadoo) [2009] I-02369 [111]. 
155 Case T-340/03 France Télécom (Wanadoo) (n 106) [217]. 
156 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie (n 42) [74]. 
157 Opinion of AG Lenz in Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie [1991] I-03359 [34]. 
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undertaking is able to adapt the production factors used and to make changes 
regarding even long-term costs. The legal approach to the predatory pricing thus 
accepts the short-run economic scenario accenting a limited period of time where 
the level of costs and prices has to be measured. In concrete and as an example, 
in AKZO, the Court assessed the nature of labour costs – as there was no 
correlation between labour costs and the output during the given period, labour 
costs must have been deemed as fixed costs.159  
A slightly different approach is presented by the Commission in its Guidance160 - 
the approach goes beyond the limits of the short run. It suggests counting with 
average avoidable costs (AAC) or long-run average avoidable costs (LRAIC). The 
reason is that during the relevant time the undertaking may have even 
additional fixed costs. The AAC thus include also the fixed costs incurred by the 
undertaking during the time under investigation. The failure to cover them 
indicates an intentional sacrifice of the undertaking and therefore pricing under 
AAC is considered by the Commission as an abusive conduct. The LRAIC test 
takes into consideration, first, that the business strategy decisions includes 
inevitably also long-run total costs, and second, that the simple AVC test may 
distort the result when variable costs are very low in relation to fixed costs.161 
Therefore the LRAIC include also the product specific fixed costs.  
The only case where the Court had to face such novelties is the Post Danmark 
case162 where the CJ explicitly approved the use of AAC for cases where there are 
much higher fixed costs in relation to variable costs, and even approved LRAIC. 
As it follows from the lexical analysis above, this preliminary ruling case is even 
the most “economic” judgment of the CJ in terms of language. A closer look shows 
that the CJ went deeper to economics also in terms of arguments. The reasoning 
itself is rather short (it is a preliminary ruling judgment which does not have to 
deal with facts), but it is apparent that the density of economics within it is 
                                            
159 Ibid 95. 
160 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, OJ C 45, 24/02/2009, 7-20 para 26 
and 64. Whish (n 81) 743. 
161 See Guidance on Enforcement Priorities - Article 82 (n 160). And also commentary in 
O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 297–298.  
162 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark [2012] ECR I-0000. 
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considerable. Regarding the pricing, the economic explanation stemming from 
Post Danmark says that “to the extent that a dominant undertaking sets its prices 
at a level covering the great bulk of the costs attributable to the supply of the goods 
or services in question, it will, as a general rule, be possible for a competitor as 
efficient as that undertaking to compete with those prices without suffering losses 
that are unsustainable in the long term.”163 
Summary and assessment 
As explained above, the essential legal test derived from economics was created 
in AKZO ruling in since that time the CJEU did not change its approach much. 
The economic rationale was once translated into a legal test which is constantly 
used by the CJEU without any major amendments. In the consequent cases after 
AKZO, the Court only adds additional economic explanations of consequences of 
the conduct, or of the intent of the undertaking.  
The approach of the CJEU remains cautious and seems far more rigid than what 
the Commission suggests. However, it is necessary to look at the fact that the 
Court has not had the opportunity to change and adapt its attitude. The only 
evolution may be seen when assessing the economic facts. Even in AKZO (1991), 
the Court went in detail through costs and prices of the investigated undertaking 
but it assessed them only through the lenses of the simple Areeda/Turner test. 
On the other hand, in Wanadoo case (2007), the Court was obliged to deal in 
more detail with the given data and to assess the methods of calculation of costs. 
In any event, it was presumably due to the pleas raised by the applicant and it 
cannot be seen as a change in the pattern of economic reasoning of the Court. 
Moreover, the GC recalled that such a question is a part of the complex economic 
assessment where the Commission has a broad margin of discretion.164 The Post 
Danmark case then presents a change in the attitude of the CJEU towards more 
economic arguments and towards coherence with the new approaches suggested 
by the Commission. It may be read as a promise for future development.  
                                            
163 Ibid 38. 
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6.2.4. Margin squeeze 
Margin squeeze is a practice which gained much attention of competition 
authorities and courts quite recently. Its dispersion in reality was due to the 
development of network industries, it predominantly followed the wave of de-
monopolization of former national (state-owned) incumbents. 
Economic explanation of margin squeeze 
From the economic perspective, margin squeeze presents a practice of the 
vertically integrated undertaking which due to its dominant position in an 
upstream market (production of an indispensable product for the downstream 
competitors) restricts competition in the downstream market because it reduces 
margins of the downstream competitors.  
The dominant undertaking may pursue two squeezing strategies. First, it sets its 
downstream prices too low in comparison to the wholesale charges, or second, it 
sets the prices for its input too high in comparison to the level of downstream 
prices. The result of both strategies is the same. Its downstream rivals cannot 
make any economically reasonable profit – either they cannot cover sufficiently 
their costs, or their prices are too high to have any possibility to compete with the 
dominant competitor. The profit of downstream competitors is therefore 
weakened or they are even eventually pushed to quit the market. As a 
consequence, such a practice strengthens the market power of the integrated 
undertaking even in the downstream market.  
The first squeezing strategy has an indirect impact on downstream competitors. 
The dominant undertaking keeps the wholesale prices on the same level, but 
lowers significantly its own retail prices. In that sense, this practice is analogous 
to predatory pricing. In order to be able to compete, the downstream rivals are 
pushed to lower their retail prices. Their profit is therefore reduced, or they even 
incur loss if they are not able to cover their costs. Eventually, they are forced to 
leave the market. The economic model of this type of margin squeeze is as 
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follows: when downstream prices minus downstream costs are lower than 
wholesale prices, then there is margin squeeze (Pd – Cd < Pw = MS).165 
The second squeezing strategy affects downstream rivals directly and, contrary to 
the first strategy, it is characterised by excessive pricing. The dominant 
undertaking keeps the same level of its retail prices, but increases its wholesale 
charges. Therefore downstream competitors have higher costs but cannot afford 
to adapt their retail prices because of the level of prices of the dominant 
undertaking. As a result, their profit is reduced or even negative, and they may 
be pushed to quit the market. The market is thus foreclosed directly. In this 
strategy, the economic model says that there is margin squeeze when 
downstream prices are lower than downstream costs plus wholesale prices 
(Pd < Cd + Pw = MS).166 
There can be, however, a third mixed strategy where the dominant undertaking 
uses both the direct and the indirect squeeze.167 It decreases its downstream 
prices and at the same time its wholesale prices rise. Within this scenario, the 
squeeze is stronger and the remaining retail margin is much smaller or even 
more negative. 
It follows that the economic rationale of margin squeeze accents three factors: (1) 
the level of retail prices of the dominant undertaking, (2) the level of wholesale 
prices of the dominant undertaking, and (3) the level of downstream costs. The 
finding of the abuse therefore depends predominantly on the comparison of all 
factors according to the above mentioned economic formula. 
The reflection in legal reasoning 
The CJEU takes the above mentioned economic foundations into its reasoning in 
the following way. In the case Industrie des poudres sphériques (T-5/97), the GC 
defines margin squeeze as a practice which takes place “when an undertaking 
which is in a dominant position on the market for an unprocessed product and 
                                            
165 O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 304–305. Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh (n 83) 230–241. 
166 O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 304–305. Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh (n 83) 230–241. 
167 Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh (n 83) 240.  
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itself uses part of its production for the manufacture of a more processed product, 
while at the same time selling off surplus unprocessed product on the market, sets 
the price at which it sells the unprocessed product at such a level that those who 
purchase it do not have a sufficient profit margin on the processing to remain 
competitive on the market for the processed product.“168 This normative statement 
directly pulls the economic argument into legal reasoning without any major 
adaptation of the sense. Furthermore, in the same judgment, the GC puts 
forward two possible ways how to demonstrate the abusive margin squeeze. 
Either it is the existence of abusive pricing of the raw material (= abusive prices in 
the upstream market), or predatory pricing for the derived product (= too low 
prices in the downstream market).169 The CJ confirms this two-fold approach 
saying that “squeeze may be the result not only of an abnormally low price in the 
retail market, but also of an abnormally high price in the wholesale market.“170 
In Deutsche Telekom, the GC comes with an economic explanation of the 
consequence of margin squeeze saying that “[i]f the applicant’s retail prices are 
lower than its wholesale charges, or if the spread between the applicant’s 
wholesale and retail charges is insufficient to enable an equally efficient operator 
to cover its product-specific costs of supplying retail access services, a potential 
competitor who is just as efficient as the applicant would not be able to enter the 
retail access services market without suffering losses.”171 The per se anti-
competitiveness of margin squeeze is highlighted in CJ’s preliminary reference 
ruling in TeliaSonera where the normative economic statement says that “[a] 
margin squeeze, in view of the exclusionary effect which it may create for 
competitors who are at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking, in the 
absence of any objective justification, is in itself capable of constituting an abuse 
within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.”172 Here, the CJ puts forward the 
exclusionary effect as an economic consequence of the margin squeeze, and 
                                            
168 Case T-5/97 Industrie des Poudres Sphériques [2000]. ECR II-3755 [178]. 
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170 Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera [2011] ECR I-527 [98]. 
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eventually allows for the possibility of an economic justification of such a 
practice. Both two aspects are further developed. 
The anti-competitiveness of margin squeeze is based on an economic presumption 
that every margin squeeze makes harm to equally efficient competitors and 
therefore it is to the detriment of competition. This leads to a conclusion that it is 
“not necessary to demonstrate an anti-competitive effect”173 and it is sufficient that 
such an effect is potential.174 
Concerning the economic justification of the conduct, the Court allows for a 
counterbalancing principle seeking for an economic optimum. The undertaking 
may prove that its behaviour being disadvantageous for competition leads, in the 
end, in economic efficiency. However, such an advantage should be balanced with 
the loss occurred to competition: “If the exclusionary effect of that practice bears 
no relation to advantages for the market and consumers, or if it goes beyond what 
is necessary in order to attain those advantages, that practice must be regarded as 
an abuse.”175 
When it comes to factual findings, as a benchmark, the GC consistently 
highlights an “efficient competitor” 176, “equally efficient operator”177 or “equally 
efficient competitor”178 which is affected by the abusive pricing. By excluding a 
competitor with “higher processing costs”179, the Court puts forward the necessity 
to count with the costs of the dominant undertaking. Such a logic is further 
developed in the Deutsche Telekom ruling where the GC explicitly explains that 
“[e]quality of opportunity is secured only if the incumbent operator sets its retail 
prices at a level which enables competitors – presumed to be just as efficient as the 
incumbent operator – to reflect all the wholesale costs in their retail prices.”180 
                                            
173 Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera (n 170) [70]. 
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This “as-efficient-competitor” test shows guidelines regarding which costs should 
be taken into account when assessing the performance in the market. The GC 
claims that a legal test of the alleged margin squeeze must be based on 
calculating charges and costs, considering revenues, and solely on numbers of the 
dominant undertaking, not of other competitors. The practice must therefore be 
tested against an efficient level of costs, and the dominant undertaking cannot be 
compared to an economically less efficient competitor. The GC reminds us in 
Deutsche Telekom that “the abusive nature of a dominant undertaking’s pricing 
practices is determined in principle on the basis of its own situation, and therefore 
on the basis of its own charges and costs, rather than on the basis of the situation 
of actual or potential competitors.”181 
In TeliaSonera, the CJ allows for an exception to this general rule, saying that 
“[o]nly where it is not possible, in particular circumstances, to refer to [...] prices 
and costs [of the undertaking concerned] should those of its competitors on the 
same market be examined.”182 Furthermore, the CJ explains that such an 
exception can take place for example ”where the cost structure of the dominant 
undertaking is not precisely identifiable for objective reasons, or where the service 
supplied to competitors consists in the mere use of an infrastructure the 
production cost of which has already been written off, [...] or where the particular 
market conditions of competition dictate it, by reason, for example, of the fact that 
the level of the dominant undertaking’s costs is specifically attributable to the 
competitively advantageous situation in which its dominant position places it.”183 
Summary and assessment 
Overall, the CJEU’s approach to margin squeeze seems constant. It clearly 
translates the economic rationale behind into legal tests. In that sense, all 
margin squeeze cases are very economic in nature and in language. They work 
with costs and prices and put forward arguments on the consequences of the 
pricing strategy of dominant undertakings.  
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Nevertheless, it can be seen in Deutsche Telekom as well as in Telefónica that a 
significant part of the reasoning is devoted to methods used to calculate relevant 
costs. Both two “new” cases (issued in years 2008 – 2012) include a significant 
pattern when it comes to methods evaluating the performance of the investigated 
undertakings. It is presumably an industry-specific pattern, because the costs 
and prices in telecoms need to be investigated with an attention. It highly 
depends on how product-specific costs are calculated, which period of time is 
taken into consideration, which costs and which revenues should be included in 
the calculation etc. The reasoning of the CJEU is predominantly an answer to the 
Commission’s approach to calculation of costs as it is generally set in the 
Guidelines and consequently used in particular decisions. At the same time, the 
arguments related to methods respond to explicit pleas of appellants. 
Generally speaking, the Court approves the Commission’s methodology without 
additional arguments related to correctness or appropriateness of the methods. 
On one hand, the court is pushed to deal with rather technical issues as it comes 
to methods, on the other hand, its reasoning does not include any new argument 
why the approach of the Commission should be deemed correct. Such a limited 
reasoning still reflects the self-limitation of the court leaving the Commission a 
margin of discretion and focusing strictly on manifest errors of assessment the 
Commission could possibly have made.184 
However, it is apparent that the Court accepts the methods of the Commission 
and pulls economic and econometric arguments into its reasoning. The way how 
the Court translates such economic considerations into its reasoning is slightly 
different from setting the economic statements of normative nature or giving 
guidelines. The Court does not create any normative reasoning saying how costs 
and other economic or econometric data shall be processed in similar cases. The 
only thing the Court says is just an approval that the Commission’s steps were 
correct in the particular case, a confirmation that its methods were not erroneous 
and a rejection of alternative methods suggested by appellants.185 It follows that 
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185 Ibid 212–264. Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission (n 43) [183–207]. 
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the “more economic approach” is reflected in margin squeeze case law of the 
Court mainly within the sphere of review of methodology.  
6.2.5. Refusal to supply 
The courts’ approach to economics is presumably different in refusal to supply 
cases. The possible scope for explicit economic reasoning is smaller because of no 
direct link to pricing and because of a limited use of economic data. The attention 
is focused mainly on facts about the circumstances, the behaviour of the 
dominant undertaking and their legal relevance for the outcome. 
The economics of refusal to supply 
From the economic point of view, the core of the problem is the economic 
dependence between the dominant undertaking and its downstream competitors, 
and the exclusionary effect of the refusal onto the downstream market. 
The economic dependence occurs when the vertically integrated dominant 
undertaking produces or controls a product/service which is an objectively 
necessary element for the business of downstream competitors (it is a “product 
sine qua non”). Due to this indispensability, the downstream competitors have no 
other option than to get products from the dominant undertaking and their 
business depends, to a certain extent, on its behaviour. Thanks to this 
dependence, the dominant undertaking has a power to influence the downstream 
market by denial to give access to the indispensable input to downstream 
competitors. By this strategy, the dominant undertaking creates artificial 
barriers to entry and forecloses vertically the downstream market. 
The economic consequence of such a conduct is two-fold: existing competitors are 
disabled to compete and potential new competitors are prevented from entry to 
the downstream market.  Therefore a refusal to supply decreases the allocative 
efficiency in the downstream market. However, on the other hand, an obligatory 
supply of an essential input may eventually lead to dynamic inefficiency because 
such an approach may reduce the willingness of the dominant undertaking to 
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invest and to innovate.186 As innovation usually requires huge investments and 
as there is a high probability of a failure, the investors are willing to undergo the 
risk only if they can legitimately expect a potential reward. In case of a too strong 
accent on the obligation to supply, they may be discouraged to make any 
innovative efforts. This aspect gets a considerable relevance mainly in the sphere 
of modern technologies and in cases where the indispensable product is covered 
by an IP right.187  
In that case, there are two opposing economic consequences of the obligation to 
grant a licence to an indispensable IP right held by a dominant undertaking. A 
positive effect of the obligation is the improvement of competition in the 
downstream market in the short run. However, in the long run, the obligation 
may cause a negative effect due to the reduction of the incentives to invest into 
research and development. The low level of investment inhibits innovation which 
may eventually lead to the decrease of consumer choice and consumer 
satisfaction.188 
This contradiction therefore requires a sensitive balancing between short-run 
and long-run effects, and between allocative and dynamic efficiency in general. 
As economics itself cannot say which effect is more desirable for the society, this 
issue raises a real challenge for law. 
The translation of economics into legal reasoning 
The early approach of the CJEU to refusal to supply may be seen in the cases 
Commercial Solvents189, United Brands190 and Benzine en Petroleum191. 
Generally, the case-law is based on an economic presumption that due to their 
market power dominant undertakings have undeniably a great influence on 
smaller competitors in downstream markets which creates a special obligation192 
                                            
186 See Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit (n 5) 250–251. See also the literature quoted there. 
187 See Ibid 251. For the discussion of efficiency arguments see Kevin Coates, Competition Law 
and Regulation of Technology Markets (Oxford University Press 2011) 93. 
188 See Motta (n 118) 64. O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 83) 523.  
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191 Case 77/77 Benzine en Petroleum [1978] ECR 1513. 
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to deal with them. The logic of the CJEU translates the idea that the harm to a 
small competitor almost automatically restraints healthy competition.193 In these 
cases, the CJEU still does not insist on a strong economic dependence between 
the dominant undertaking and small competitors and therefore does not define 
the concept of indispensability.  
In later cases, the CJEU started to add other economic elements into its analysis. 
It highlighted the indispensability of the product for downstream competitors and 
the real (or potential) foreclosing effect in the downstream market.194 Since 
1990s, the case law is reflecting a shift in the approach towards a more detailed 
analysis of all features of anti-competitive refusal.195 The Court further 
elaborates on the concept of indispensability of a given product,196 evaluates in 
more detail the vertical foreclosure, deals with a possible economic justification197 
because of efficiency gains, and generally, it is more prone to the case-by case 
examination of effects. 
The concept of indispensability is further explained in the Ladbroke case198 and 
predominantly in the Bronner case.199 In Ladbroke, the GC limits the notion of 
indispensability only to the extent that it has influence on the current or 
potential workable competition on the market.”200 In the Bronner case, which 
dealt with the distribution of newspapers, the CJ created a legal test to identify 
the indispensability which is based on two economic assumptions: (1) the real 
existence of substitutes, (2) the existence barriers which prevent from creating 
potential substitutes. According to the CJ, the indispensability takes place if 
“there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for the home-delivery 
                                            
193 Presumably in accordance with the ordoliberal view. 
194 Case 311/84 CBEM v CLT and IBP (Télé-Marketing) [1985] ECR 3261 [27]. However, the CJ 
did not develop the content of the indispensability; as the undertaking was a statutory monopoly, 
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195 Case T-69/89 RTE [1991] ECR II-485. Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP  
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scheme.”201 The test therefore suggests a two-step analysis. If there are (even less 
advantageous) substitutes, the product or service cannot be regarded as 
indispensable.202 If there are no substitutes, it is necessary to examine whether 
there are any technical, legal or economic barriers which make it impossible or 
excessively difficult to establish a concurring delivery system.203 The CJ further 
claims that even an economic disadvantage for creating an alternative means of 
distribution does not lead directly to the conclusion that the service in question is 
absolutely essential for downstream competitors.204 In that sense, it follows from 
the ruling that the notion of indispensability shall be interpreted as an objective 
concept, and that it is necessary to assess the objective existence of barriers 
disabling to make potential substitutes. 
The notion of indispensability was analysed also in the preliminary ruling in IMS 
Health. As to the facts of the case, the IMS Health supplied information on sales 
in the pharmaceutical industry which was based on data from its own customers 
which co-operated on the creation of a database called a “brick structure”. In the 
judgment, the CJ puts the customers’ involvement as a new element into the 
assessment of indispensability, especially “the degree of participation by the users 
in the development of the structure and the outlay, particularly in terms of cost, on 
the part of potential users.”205  The economic explanation says that a high level of 
participation may create a dependency by users who would bear excessive 
switching costs if they decide to acquire information from an alternative 
source.206 As a consequence, the users are “locked-in”207  and forced not to change 
the existing situation which contributes to the existence of indispensability.  
                                            
201 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner (n 195) [41]. 
202 Ibid 43. 
203 Ibid 44. 
204 Ibid 45–46. 
205 Case C-418/01 IMS Health (n 195) [30]. 
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Competition Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 98.   
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The question on the obligation to grant a license to an IP right arose already in 
Volvo/Renault case208 and was more elaborated in Magill case. In Magill, both the 
GC and the CJ on appeal make a list of conditions under which a refusal to 
licence is deemed abusive: (1) indispensability, (2) prevention of the appearance 
of a new product for which there is a potential demand, (3) lack of economic 
justification, (4) foreclosure of the downstream market.209 In comparison to the 
older case-law, the CJ adds a new economic component into its analysis and puts 
forward the idea of desirable innovation and market development. According to 
the CJ, the refusal to supply was deemed abusive because “the conduct prevented 
the appearance of a new product, [...] which the appellants did not offer and for 
which there was a potential consumer demand.”210 The Court thus takes into 
account the prospective competition and the potential development of the market 
which may be negatively influenced by a dominant undertaking. 
This idea is further developed in the IMS Health case where the CJ calls for a 
balancing of interests, comparing the protection of IP rights and the freedom to 
contract on one side with the protection of free competition on the other side.211 
According to the CJ, the protection of free competition wins and therefore the 
refusal is deemed anti-competitive when it “prevents the development of the 
secondary market to the detriment of consumers.”212 The interest of consumers is 
thus put into the analysis as an additional component. By doing this, the CJ pulls 
into its reasoning the focus on dynamic efficiency (which is not, however, 
explicitly spelled out) and takes into consideration the impact of the refusal on 
the market in the long-run. 
The issue of innovation and the concept of the new product are discussed also in 
Microsoft I case213 where the GC deals, i.a., with the consequences of the lack of 
interoperability. Generally, the GC approves the Commission’s approach. When it 
comes to the circumstances relating to the appearance of a new product, the GC 
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210 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP  (Magill) (n 195) [54]. 
211 Case C-418/01 IMS Health (n 195) [48]. 
212 Ibid.  
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further develops the reasoning included in Magill and IMS Health. The GC holds 
that such circumstances cannot be the only yardstick determining the cause of 
prejudice to consumers and that “such prejudice may arise where there is a 
limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical development.”214 
Within the concept of a new product, the Court deals with the issue of dynamic 
efficiency. However, the necessity to balance between allocative and dynamic 
efficiency, is never explicitly mentioned in the judgments. 
The Microsoft I judgment also includes a strengthened economic reasoning on the 
aspect of elimination of competition. The GC endorses the Commission’s view 
that Microsoft was able to use its quasi-monopoly on the upstream (operating 
system) market in order to influence the downstream (work group server 
operating systems) market thanks to a so-called leverage effect.215 Due to the 
leverage effect, it is not necessary to examine whether the undertaking which 
holds the dominant position on the first product market is dominant also on the 
second market.216 Furthermore, the GC approves that the risk of the elimination 
of competition is well established mainly due to two economically relevant 
aspects: significant network effects on the downstream market, and a high 
difficulty to reverse a potential elimination.217 Concerning the mere likelihood of 
the elimination of competition, the GC reminds us the necessity of a preventive 
intervention of the Commission, explaining that Article 102 “does not apply only 
from the time when there is no more, or practically no more, competition on the 
market.”218 Overall, the GC puts clarifying economic arguments into its reasoning 
mainly in the form of an approval of the Commission’s steps. 
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A very similar approach is taken in the ClearStream case, where the GC 
highlights that the undertaking held a de facto monopoly of the services of 
clearing and settlement which made it an “indispensable trading partner” on the 
market.219 The indispensability of the service then must be assessed in the light 
of the settled case law, i.e. it occurs “there is no real or potential substitute”220 for 
the service in question. Furthermore, the GC upheld the Commission’s view on 
actual effects of the refusal – harm to innovation and competition which is 
ultimately in the detriment of consumers.221 
Summary and assessment 
In the field of refusal to supply, we can see a step-by-step development in the 
translation of economics into legal reasoning of the Court. From case to case, the 
Court adds new economic inputs into its reasoning. The evolution of economic 
reasoning of the Court presumably reflected both the changes in economic 
doctrine and the improvements in the approach of the Commission. 
The early case law works only with a simplified economic rationale that a 
dominant undertaking has undeniably a strong influence on its minor 
competitors, while in newer cases, the Court consequently puts on the table more 
and more complex legal tests derived from modern economics.  
There is an apparent increase in the use of detailed economic analysis of all 
necessary features of the allegedly anti-competitive conduct and its 
consequences.  
Presumably due to the industry-specific character of recent cases, the Court puts 
emphasis on the effects of the refusal, i.e. predominantly impact on the desirable 
and necessary innovation within the field of modern technologies.  
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6.2.6. Tying and bundling 
Anticompetitive tying and bundling are practices where the dominant 
undertaking forces its customers to buy various combinations of its products. 
Pure bundling occurs when two or more products are offered only together 
without the possibility to buy them individually, while in mixed bundling 
products can be purchased separately but their bundled version is offered with a 
discount.  
Slightly differently, tying is a practice where the purchase of one product is 
conditioned by the purchase of another product.222 From the business strategy 
point of view, tying may take several forms. A tying based on a contract simply 
forces the contracting party to purchase the tied product exclusively from the 
dominant undertaking together with the tying product.223 Tying effects may be 
caused also through refusal to deal where the dominant undertaking is willing to 
supply the tying product only in case that the customer buys also the tied 
product. Another type is a so-called technical tying. It occurs typically in the field 
of modern technologies where one product is connected with another one, and the 
customer is not allowed to buy them separately.224   
However, in its reasoning, courts do not make clear distinction between various 
shades of these practices and generally use bundling and tying as 
interchangeable synonyms.  
The economic rationale behind 
Competition law forbids tying and bundling because of their undesirable 
economic consequences – foreclosure effect. However, looking at tying and 
bundling from the economic perspective, we can see both pro-competitive and 
anti-competitive effects.   
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Regarding, pro-competitive effects, tying and bundling may lead to efficiencies 
mainly due to the decrease in costs of production and distribution. The 
production of more products at the same time may decrease the average costs. A 
sale of combined products which are mutual complements may create economies 
of scope and scale in comparison to marketing and distribution of separated 
products. 
Bundling may also lead to synergy effects. Consumers make differences between 
the evaluation of the whole bundle and the evaluation of the separate products 
within the bundle.225 The value of the whole bundle is usually higher because of 
lower transaction costs.226 When using a combination of products, consumers may 
face a problem how to combine them in order to ensure an optimal functionality. 
If these products are sold in a bundle, such a problem disappears, which leads to 
savings in time, energy and generally, in transaction costs. 
Another positive aspect of the synergy effect which increases the value of the 
whole bundle is the reduction of information asymmetry.227 If consumers are not 
sure about the quality of an offered product, this uncertainty is reduced when the 
product is sold in a bundle with a known complementary product. Selling 
complementary products together may therefore reinforce the assurance of 
quality, especially if the functionality of both products used together is 
sufficiently guaranteed.228  Moreover, consumers may consider the bundle as an 
innovative product which better satisfies their needs.229 
On the other hand, the anti-competitive effects are as follows. Due to tying, a 
leverage effect may occur. The dominant undertaking uses its dominance on the 
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market of one (tying) product in order to eliminate competition on the market of 
the second (tied) product. The market power is thus spilled over into another 
market. As a result, the market is foreclosed for competitors that offer separate 
products. Or there are barriers to entry which prevent potential competitors that 
are unable to offer products in a bundle to penetrate the market. 
Tying and bundling may have negative effects directly on customers. When 
customers are forced to buy products only in the bundle, it reduces their freedom 
of choice and it may lead to decrease in consumer satisfaction.  
Moreover, tying enables the undertaking to use price discrimination towards 
their customers regardless their elasticity of demand. Due to bundling, the 
customers are pushed to purchase products that they did not intent to buy which 
eventually deforms the demand and distorts the allocation of production because 
a part of consumer surplus is shifted to producers.   
Tying may also reduce the incentives to innovate. New competitors may 
challenge a need of risky investment on both the tying and the tied market at the 
same moment in order to be able to compete with the dominant undertaking. 
Regarding this double uncertainty of the potential reward of their investment, 
their willingness to undergo the risk is lowered, and therefore the barriers of 
entry are stronger.230 
Translation into law 
The European courts gradually translated the economics behind into its 
reasoning in the following way. The landmark decision in the field of 
anticompetitive tying is the judgment of the GC in the Hilti case (T-30/89). 
Concerning the facts, Hilti’s customers of nail cartridges were made to purchase 
also nails exclusively from Hilti which was deemed both by the Commission and 
by the GC as an abusive tying. 
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The findings of the abuse in the judgment are based predominantly on the 
definition of the relevant market. The GC identifies three specific markets of the 
products in question (nail guns, cartridge strips and nails)231 and denies Hilti’s 
argument that all the products form an indivisible bundle justifying why they 
should be offered together.232 However, the GC does not go very deep into the 
analysis of anticompetitive effects of tying. 
The approach of the GC is therefore very simplistic and rather legalistic. The sole 
fact that the purchase of one product was conditioned by the purchase of another 
one leads to finding that the conduct is abusive.233 The GC focuses on the 
decrease in the consumers’ freedom of choice and does not possible positive effects 
of the conduct. It even denies possible economic justification suggested by Hilti234 
and it does not pursue any analysis regarding efficiency gains. 
The reasoning of the GC is generally rather short, incomplete and superficial. It 
translates a simple economic argument, saying that tying may lead into a 
foreclosure of the market, into a normative claim that tying is illegal per se. 
A minor step forward can be seen in the Tetra Pak II case.235 The GC moves 
further, at least in fact that it uses more economic arguments to support the 
findings that the behaviour in question was abusive. However, the outcome 
seems the same – the GC concludes that tying forecloses the market and is 
therefore anticompetitive. 
Concerning the facts, Tetra Pak forced its customers to buy the primary product 
(packaging machines) together with a tied product (cartons) and claimed they are 
a part of an integrated distribution system. However, the GC did not accept the 
argument that the combined offer is justified by the commercial usage and the 
natural link between products, saying that “[e]ven a usage which is acceptable in 
a normal situation [...] cannot be accepted in the case of a market where 
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competition is already restricted.”236 The economic explanation of the 
consequences of the behaviour is constructed as follows: “An overall strategy 
aiming to make the customer totally dependent on Tetra Pak for the entire life of 
the machine once purchased or leased, thereby excluding in particular any 
possibility of competition at the level both of cartons and of associated 
products.”237 
Overall, the approach copies the way of reasoning from the Hilti case: tying 
increases the economic dependence of dominant undertaking’s customers 
therefore tied-sale clauses are unfair.238 Consequently, this conclusion was 
approved even by the CJ.239  
Both in Hilti and Tetra Pak II, three economically relevant aspects of tying were 
put on table: (1) barriers of entry for competitors offering only individual 
products, (2) restriction of the freedom of choice, (3) leverage effect on the tied 
product market. But still, the courts do not take into consideration other features 
based on economics, such as the real impact on consumers, possible positive 
effects or the incentives to innovate. The economic reasoning in these cases is 
therefore rather limited. 
In that sense, a big step forward is apparent a decade later in the Microsoft I 
case.240 The tying aspect of the case lied in the fact, that Microsoft offered its 
operating system solely together with a media player application (Windows 
Media Player, “WMP”) and there was no possibility to get the system without the 
player. It is apparent from the reasoning of the GC, that the case reflects the 
modernisation efforts in the assessment of tying. The GC considerably departs 
and moves away from the rather legalistic approach to a more economics-based 
approach which is visible in various aspects. 
In its decision, the Commission suggested a new test for examining alleged tying 
practices which was consequently approved by the GC. The assessment of tying 
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therefore requires four steps. First, it must be established that the tying product 
and tied products are two separate products. Second, the undertaking in question 
is dominant in the market for the tying product. Third, there is no possibility to 
get the tying product without the tied product. Fourth, the practice forecloses 
competition.241 By approving the methodology suggested by the Commission, the 
GC creates a new legal test derived from economic assumptions.242 
The first and the second step are the same as in the older case law. The 
assessment of tying makes sense only if there are (at least) two separate markets 
for both products and if the investigated undertaking is dominant at least on the 
tying market product.  
The third step brings an improvement into the analysis. It requires an aspect of 
coercion to be examined. In other words, tying occurs only if customers are 
coerced to buy the tied product together with the tying product, and there is 
really no possibility to get them separately. As a consequence, it reduces the 
freedom of choice. Within the reasoning, it was sufficient for the GC to find that 
the media player was integrated into the operating system. In that sense, it was 
a technical tying. The GC disregarded the fact that users were not required to 
pay additional fees for the application and concluded that the price for the tied 
product was apparently included in the price of the whole system.243 These 
findings led, according to the GC, to the conclusion that the coercion was 
proved.244 
The fourth aspect – the issue of foreclosure – brings finally more economics into 
the assessment of the effects of tying. The analysis is based on leverage theory, 
information asymmetry, transactional costs and network effects.  
Regarding leverage theory, the GC assumes that tying in this case was capable to 
“alter the balance of competition in favour of Microsoft and to the detriment of 
                                            
241 Ibid 842. 
242 Ibid 869. 
243 Ibid 967 – 969.   
244 Ibid 975.   
83 
 
other operators.”245 The GC further explains that as the media player was 
automatically present on the majority of computers worldwide, it therefore 
reached the same level of market penetration as the operating system did not 
have to compete on the merits with competing products.246 It follows that the 
dominant position on the operating systems market could be almost effortlessly 
spilled over into the market of media applications. The impact on competitors on 
the second market is that without the advantage of the tied distribution, they are 
prevented to reach the same level of penetration as Microsoft has.247 What the 
GC highlights here, is that tying prevents the competition on merits. In other 
words, the foreclosure cannot be assessed only as a barrier to entry of all possible 
competitors but as a prevention of those developers of media players who would 
be objectively capable to compete with Microsoft under normal circumstances.248   
Additionally, the GC puts information asymmetry and a concept of transactional 
costs as aspects supporting Microsoft’s foreclosure. Having a media player pre-
installed, customers get rid of additional efforts to download an alternative media 
player. Moreover, the pre-installation makes a presumption of a good 
functionality together with the operating system, thus customers may feel more 
comfortable without the need to search for information of the functionality of the 
application purchased from a competing developer.249 Therefore the tying 
decreases the incentives of customers to search for and eventually get a 
competing product.   
Furthermore, the GC approves the Commission’s theory based on the existence of 
network effects.250 Thanks to the ubiquity of the WMP, the content providers and 
software developers incline to choose only this one technology and create 
products compatible with WMP because of lower additional costs and opportunity 
to catch a wide spectrum of customers.251 
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In addition to the new four-step legal test, the GC admitted another novelty. For 
the first time, the GC acknowledged that there may be efficiency claims justifying 
the tying practice. It seems that the GC moved away considerably from per se 
illegality of tying. However, the reasoning does not include any guidelines or a 
helpful construction of how the efficiency justification should be assessed and 
how a balancing test should be performed. In the end, the GC rejected all 
justifying arguments as not proved.252  
Summary and assessment 
The differences in economic reasoning between Hilti and Tetra Pak on one side, 
and Microsoft on the other side show that the GC made a considerable shift 
towards more economic arguments in abusive tying case law. At the outset, it 
worked with per se illegality which was not supported by any further economic 
arguments. A decade later, the GC was apt to admit new economic arguments 
into its reasoning and to develop an approach based on economic considerations 
and actual effects of the behaviour in question. However, similarly to other 
practices examined above, the increase of economic arguments in the reasoning of 
the court is predominantly a reaction to the parties’ initiatives.  
Moreover, it is arguable whether the GC would adopt such a detailed effects-
based approach in less complex cases being outside the sphere of modern 
technologies, or whether the Microsoft case was just a positive deviation. In any 
event, the approach of the GC in the Microsoft case is still not very praised. The 
commentators still insist that it neglects more elaborated analyses, holds a per se 
approach and disregards the effects-based investigation.253 Therefore even if 
there is a pattern of development, the Court has still not reached a desirable level 
of its approach. 
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6.2.7. Fidelity rebates 
The core of anti-competitive rebates lies in the fact that the dominant 
undertaking commits its customers to take products exclusively from it in the 
exchange for lower prices. Such conditional rebates lead to the reduction of 
customers’ freedom of choice, to the foreclosure of the market for small 
competitors and to the consolidation of the market power of the dominant 
undertaking.    
Typically, rebates are used towards retailers, distributors or other 
intermediaries, and do not affect final consumers directly. Retailers are thus 
forced to take a certain quantity of products or they breach their contractual 
obligation. However, they may have also a direct impact on end-users when they 
are used as a leverage to foreclose an adjacent market through bundling.  
Economics behind fidelity rebates 
From the economic point of view, rebates create a conditional structure of prices 
based on price discrimination. The undertaking offers a lower price if the 
purchaser reaches a certain level of the bought products (quantities), often 
during a certain period of time. Economics assumes that such a structure of 
prices may have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects. 
Regarding the anti-competitive effects, fidelity rebates and loyalty discounts have 
the power to eliminate both actual and potential rivals in the market through 
ensuring that customers are tied to the dominant undertaking and will not 
change it for a competing supplier. The market may be foreclosed both vertically 
and horizontally. The effect can be achieved through contractual obligations or 
simply through pricing policy.   
The vertical foreclosure occurs when the dominant undertaking offers fidelity 
rebates to a retailer in the exchange of the exclusivity clause according to which 
the retailer is not allowed or is limited to sell products from other competitors. 
The competitors are therefore foreclosed to access the channel of distribution. 
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The horizontal foreclosure arises in case that the dominant undertaking delivers 
its product directly to customers and bundles this product with a product from an 
adjacent market. Through the fidelity rebates on the main market, it forecloses 
the access to the adjacent market.  
On the other hand, fidelity rebates and loyalty discounts may have positive 
impact by leading to economic efficiencies. First, they allow performing price 
discrimination which is based on differences in elasticity of demand between 
various groups of customers, i.e., to charge higher prices to customers whose 
elasticity of demand is low, and vice versa to decrease prices for customers with a 
high elasticity of demand – the decrease is then conditioned by the contractual 
promise to purchase a certain quantity of products.254 Such price discrimination 
is therefore capable to lead to efficient allocation of sources. On the other hand, if 
undertakings were always forced to avoid such price discrimination, they would 
not be able to adapt their price strategy to differences in elasticity and the higher 
price for all customers would lead to the fact that certain customers would not be 
satisfied at all. Consequently, it would decrease the total output. 
Second, such price discrimination may even lead to the efficient recovery of fixed 
costs, especially in case of a production with considerably high fixed costs. In that 
case, it would be economically reasonable to charge high prices which would 
repay the incurred fixed costs. However, the higher the price, the less quantity is 
demanded. On the other hand, the increasing volume of demanded products 
decreases the average fixed costs per product. In order to escape from this 
contradictory situation, the undertaking may pursue a pricing strategy based on 
differences in the elasticity of demand and therefore adapt the pricing in order to 
achieve efficiencies.255 
Third, rebates may create better incentives for the dominant undertaking to 
invest into innovation. Again, especially when the production involves high fixed 
costs, the undertaking may be reluctant to invest unless it is sure that the 
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investment is eventually recovered. Fidelity rebates thus increase the security 
and reduce the initial risk.256  
Fourth, in case of vertical relations between the dominant supplier and its retail 
distributors, fidelity rebates may improve incentives for retailers and 
consequently bring additional benefits for consumers. When retailers purchase 
goods for lower prices, it encourages them to perform a better marketing strategy 
and to compete more efficiently on the end-user market.257    
Fifth, fidelity rebates may increase total welfare by reducing the negative side 
effect of the relationship within the distributional channel where both the 
supplier and the retailer hold a certain market power. The effect is labelled as 
“double marginalisation”258: the supplier takes its costs plus its margin to make a 
wholesale price which presents an input cost for the retailer. The retailer then 
puts its own margin to the price in the height corresponding to its market power. 
In comparison to the scenario under rebates, this leads to higher prices for final 
consumers who consequently purchase less quantity of products. As a result, 
total output is lower than in case where rebates are applied.259 
Therefore, the eventual impact of fidelity rebates on competition should be 
assessed by balancing the counter effects and finding whether the practice leads 
to the increase of output or not. It is argued that the actual anti-competitive 
effect of rebates is quite rare and it requires several cumulative conditions to be 
fulfilled.260 
Reflection into legal reasoning 
Fidelity rebates may be associated with exclusive dealing which was deemed per 
se illegal in one of the older cases, Suiker Unie.261 The CJ explained that they are 
anti-competitive as they reduce customers’ freedom of choice, decrease 
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competition to the detriment of consumers and reinforce market power of the 
dominant undertaking.262 The per se illegality was confirmed also in the 
judgment Hoffmann-La Roche where the CJ explicitly held that if the dominant 
undertaking applies a system of conditional fidelity rebates, it abuses its 
dominant position.263 Furthermore, the CJ added that it is indifferent whether 
the quantity of the purchase is large or small as well as whether the rebates were 
requested by the customer or not.264  
Next to the exclusive purchases, fidelity rebates may be arranged as incentives 
without any exclusivity clause. Their abusive nature was confirmed by the CJ in 
the Michelin I case (C-322/81).265 As to the facts of the case, Michelin’s pricing 
policy required customers to achieve a certain threshold of purchases per year in 
order to be granted discounts in the following year. In its reasoning, the CJ 
admitted that such quantitative rebates are different from rebates requiring 
fidelity by exclusivity clauses. Therefore it called for the necessity to “consider all 
the circumstances” and to examine the effect of such rebates on the freedom of 
choice, barriers to entry and strengthening the position of the dominant 
undertaking.266 However, in the end, the CJ did not enrich its reasoning by any 
new economic element. It concluded that such quantitative rebates are abusive in 
the same way as classical fidelity rebates because of their loyalty-inducing 
nature. The CJ explained that “[a]ny system under which discounts are granted 
according to the quantities sold during  a relatively long reference period has the 
inherent effect, at the end of that period, of increasing pressure on the buyer to 
reach the purchase figure needed to obtain the discount or to avoid suffering the 
expected loss for the entire period.”267 Additionally, the CJ examined economic 
relevance of facts of the case and but it did not use them as a yardstick to assess 
the impact on competition and consumers. It rather emphasised that all the 
factors (the extent of the discount, the reference period, the lack of written 
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contracts) just accentuated the effect leading to fidelity268 and therefore 
supported the conclusion of inherent anti-competitiveness of loyalty-inducing 
rebates.  
In comparison to the previous case law, the reasoning in the Michelin I case 
includes, on one hand, additional economic explanations of consequences, but on 
the other hand, it immediately leads to the same conclusion of per se illegality. So 
even if there might be a hint of pulling more economics inside, at the end of the 
day, the legal test remains unchanged.  
The per se approach persisted in rebates cases even in 1990s. The reasoning of 
the GC in the case British Gypsum copied the previous case law. On one hand the 
GC admitted that exclusive purchasing commitments are a natural part of 
commercial relations and their effects must therefore be examined in their 
specific contexts.269 On the other hand, it emphasised further that this 
presumption applies only in a normal competitive market situation and therefore 
the commitments cannot be unreservedly accepted in the case of a market where 
competition is already restricted.270 Moreover, the GC did not accept the 
justification that the purchasers were allowed to terminate the contract at any 
time explaining that “an undertaking in a dominant position is powerful enough 
to require its customers not only to enter into such contracts but also to maintain 
them, with the result that the legal possibility of termination is in fact rendered 
illusory.”271 Reminding the special responsibility of the dominant undertaking,272 
the GC highlights that due to its significant market power, the undertaking is 
not allowed to commit its purchasers by exclusivity clauses regardless the market 
power of those purchasers. 
The very same approach is taken in the case Irish Sugar (T-228/97) where the GC 
repeats older case law insists on the triad of economically relevant aspects of 
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fidelity rebates: reduction of the freedom of choice, foreclosure of the market, and 
reinforcement of the market power.273 
From all the above examined cases, it follows that the courts’ economic reasoning 
in rebates cases remains consistent and just accents the above mentioned three 
anti-competitive effects.274 The courts did not admit any arguments justifying the 
practice by economic efficiencies, they did not take into consideration actual 
effects of the behaviour and moreover, they disregarded market power of 
purchasers or the actual ability of competitors to compete on merits with the 
dominant undertaking. The courts are only willing to add economic explanations 
of the behaviour which, however, do not have any significant impact on the way 
of their reasoning.  
A slight step further may be seen in the case British Airways (T-219/99) where 
the performance reward schemes to travel agents were, in nature, similar to 
Michelin’s loyalty-inducing rebates. Within its reasoning, on one hand, the GC 
calls for an assessment in accordance with previous case law, 275  but on the other 
hand it presents it in a slightly modified way as it suggests a two-step test. At 
first, it must be examined whether the practice “had a fidelity-building effect”. If 
the effect is determined, then at second, it must be assessed whether the practice 
was “based on an economically justified consideration”.276   
This approach was even upheld by the CJ on appeal. It stated that “it first has to 
be determined whether those discounts or bonuses can produce an exclusionary 
effect,”277 and as a second step, “[i]t then needs to be examined whether there is an 
objective economic justification for the discounts and bonuses granted.“278 
Furthermore, the CJ explicitly admitted that “an undertaking is at liberty to 
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demonstrate that its bonus system producing an exclusionary effect is 
economically justified.”279 
In this case, both courts explicitly admitted possible economic justification of 
rebates. It means that an additional economic argument is pulled into the legal 
test. However, in this particular case, the GC did not accept the efficiency 
arguments because there was no precise link between economies of scale and the 
increases in the rates of remuneration paid to travel agents,280 and therefore the 
rebates were not able to “constitute a mode of exercise of the normal operation of 
competition or allow it to reduce its costs.”281 
Further development is brought by the Michelin II case (T-203/01) where the GC 
shifts the angle of its assessment. First it starts with the economic presumption 
that quantity rebates are “deemed to reflect gains in efficiency and economies of 
scale”282 and therefore there are “generally considered not to have the foreclosure 
effect”283 as long as they are “linked solely to the volume of purchases made from 
an undertaking occupying a dominant position.”284 Then the GC follows that such 
a rebate system is not abusive “unless the criteria and rules for granting the 
rebate reveal that the system is not based on an economically justified 
countervailing advantage but tends, following the example of loyalty and target 
rebates, to prevent customers from obtaining their supplies from competitors.”285 
The reasoning of the GC thus continues alongside the line of “the example of 
loyalty and target rebates” and concludes that “a quantity rebate system in which 
there is a significant variation in the discount rates between the lower and higher 
steps, which has a reference period of one year and in which the discount is fixed 
on the basis of total turnover achieved during the reference period, has the 
characteristics of a loyalty-inducing discount system.”286 In accordance with the 
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reasoning in British Airways, the GC then admitted the possibility of an objective 
economic justification of the practice. However, even in this case, the GC rejected 
all the raised arguments mainly because they were not capable to rebut the 
loyalty-inducing effect and they did not show any countervailing advantage.287   
So even if the GC puts forward a possible economic justification, it does not make 
clear how such a justification should look like in order to be capable to 
persuasively overcome the negative loyalty-inducing effect. Although cost savings 
and economies of scale are theoretically acceptable to justify rebates, once a 
fidelity feature is in a game, they have no chance to be applied. It thus seems 
that in spite of the explicit proclamation of possible economic justification, the 
loyalty-inducing quantitative rebates are still deemed as per se illegal. 
The Tomra case (T-155/06) brings additional economic arguments to the 
assessment of rebates which generally regard the economic facts related to the 
concrete conduct and their assessment within the case. The GC had to assess the 
predictability of demand of Tomra’s customers which allegedly allowed it to make 
exclusive dealing commitments. Tomra argued that it was impossible to estimate 
requirements of every customer precisely. The GC did not accept it and construed 
the sufficient predictability from the facts that “the customer sometimes indicated 
its expected future requirements,“288 “the demand of each customer was relatively 
easy to predict“ due to enough information,289 “‘non-recurrent’ and ‘irregular’ 
demand may […] none the less be readily foreseeable,“290 and “targets set by the 
agreements […] corresponded at least to somewhere between 75% and 80% of its 
total demand.“291 Within this case, the GC highlights the economic relevance of 
certain facts and creates a flow of supportive arguments based on economics.   
Moreover, in Tomra, the GC puts on table another economic explanation – a 
concept of an “unavoidable trading partner” as an inherent aspect of the strong 
dominant position. The GC deduces a “presumption of unavoidability” just from 
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the dominant position as such. The dominant position just presupposes that “for 
a substantial part of the demand, there are no proper substitutes for the product 
supplied by the dominant undertaking”.292 In that case, the GC pulls an economic 
argument into its reasoning in a form of a presumption. However, it is criticisable 
because this presumption is not based on actual data. Its probability is 
disputable because the real effects may be different.293  
The unresolved question is whether a quittance of the market by competitors is a 
sign of foreclosure or just a natural consequence of healthy competition on the 
market. Economics does not see an automatic causality link between the anti-
competitive foreclosure and the exit of competitors because the latter may be 
caused by other factors. However, the Commission took such a consequence as an 
evidence of abuse and the GC endorsed it.294 
A promising shift in the approach is suggested by AG Mazák in C-549/10 P – 
Tomra where he explicitly calls for a profound assessment of actual or likely 
existing exclusionary effects of rebates. He especially highlights that the 
approach to rebates should abandon the presumption of anti-competitive 
foreclosure and that it should focus on the demonstrable evidence of such an 
effect.295 His appeal to consider better the way of reasoning is mostly visible in 
his statement that “[r]eference to negative (anti-competitive) effects should clearly 
not be mechanical.”296 
However, the CJ on appeal insists just on mechanical assessment and approved 
that “the General Court was correct to hold that the determination of a precise 
threshold of foreclosure of the market beyond which the practices at issue had to 
be regarded as abusive was not required for the purposes of applying Article 102 
TFEU.”297 
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The GC’s recent judgment in the Intel case (T-289/09) seems as a copy of the 
Tomra ruling. It uses a myriad of economic explanations but it still continues in 
the same line of arguments regarding fidelity rebates. It highlights that 
agreements with exclusivity or at least quasi-exclusivity clauses are considered 
per se abusive. The economic presumption behind is that such clauses inevitably 
lead to restriction of buyers’ freedom of choice and to restriction of competitors’ 
access to the market.298 Moreover, the GC insists on per se illegality of exclusivity 
rebates and reminds that “the question whether an exclusivity rebate can be 
categorized as abusive does not depend on an analysis of the circumstances of the 
case aimed at establishing a potential foreclosure effect”.299 Such an approach is 
accompanied by economic explanations based on the concept of “unavoidable 
trading partner” and “contestability of a market”.300 The GC builds the 
explanation on the economic presumption that “[t]he grant of exclusivity rebates 
enables the undertaking in a dominant position to use its economic power on the 
non-contestable share of the demand of the customer as leverage to secure also the 
contestable share, thus making access to the market more difficult for a 
competitor.”301 
Interestingly, the GC had to deal with “as-efficient competitor” test (“AEC”) as a 
means of a claim for justification. However, it did not accept the positive result of 
the AEC test as a sufficient justificatory argument explaining that it “would not 
deprive that practice either of its anti-competitive object or of its capability to 
make access to the market more difficult for the competitor.”302 Therefore it still 
seems that the GC is not willing to listen to AG Mazák’s suggestions and keeps 
rather a resistance to the effects-based approach in rebates cases.  
Summary and assessment 
From the economic point of view, it is at least problematic to label rebates as 
unlawful automatically once they cause the loyalty-inducing effect. As argued by 
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economists, “[a] low price, if it is low enough, will always create “fidelity” or 
“loyalty” in the obvious, lawful sense that it encourages buyers to purchase from 
the supplier offering the best terms.”303 Therefore the economic reasoning of the 
courts remains flawed and unclear because it still cannot make a comprehensible 
demarcation line between the actual foreclosure and simple and desirable 
competition on the merits. A questionable aspect is also the reliance on the 
foreclosure effect which is based on an economic presumption rather than on 
clear demonstration of such an effect. Moreover, the courts rather ignore the 
objective ability of rivals to compete on the same level of efficiency, and they 
disregard the purchasers’ power. 
In the newer cases, there is a light shift in the assessment of effects from pure 
presumption to evidence-based demonstration. However, going too far would also 
bring an undesirable result: the duty to demonstrate more than just likelihood 
may be deceptive and precarious especially in cases where the anti-competitive 
effects are likely to appear in a longer term horizon. Overall, the reasoning of 
courts still lags behind and creates a gap between (even basic) economic 
considerations and their legal reflection. 
In conclusion, the economic reasoning of the CJEU in case of rebates remains 
almost unchanged. Even if both courts put on table more economic arguments 
and economic explanations, at the end of the day, their reasoning still returns 
back to early case law. Still the reasoning does not include any convincing 
economic arguments related to the actual effects of rebates, nor are the courts 
capable or willing to formulate precise contours of economic justification.  
It makes quite a sharp contrast with the purely economic view presented above. 
The courts are not able to answer the call for balancing the counter effects of 
rebates. They do not pull into its reasoning any of the offered pro-competitive 
arguments and do not take into consideration the position of competitors or the 
impact of the final output and, eventually, welfare.   
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7. Appraisal 
The scene in background is clear: Competition law is inspired by economics, the 
European Commission calls for more economic approach in competition law, the 
focus in EU competition law is shifting more and more towards the standard of 
consumer welfare. However, since the CJEU is the ultimate standard-maker in 
EU law, it is vital to see how it perceives the gradual “economization” of 
competition law and how it reflects it within its own case law.  
With validity at least for the field of abuse of dominance, it follows from the 
analyses above that its perception and reflection is slow, cautious, uneven or 
rather random. Although the CJEU is pushed to reflect the “more economic 
approach”, at least recently, within its reasoning inasmuch as the circumstances 
require it, its approach remains conservative and rigid. On the other hand, if we 
take it with more understanding and sympathy, it may be described as ever 
evolving and gradually developing.   
The lexical analysis reveals that courts are generally reluctant to use economic 
terminology. There is no apparent increase in the use of economic terms, and the 
CJEU does not seem to keep a certain relation between the terms which are 
actually used within its judgments. The terms are used rather randomly, and 
there are only several lonely cases where both the General Court and the Court 
of Justice let economics penetrate legal parlance more visibly.  
However, taken in isolation, it does not show an undeniable deterrence of the 
CJEU to understand and use economic concepts. An alternative explanation 
could say that the CJEU (and presumably any court) needs to accommodate 
economics into its reasoning in a way which fits into the legal language. The 
mere ignorance of economic terms thus does not reflect unwillingness to 
understand and apply economics, but on the other hand, it supports the view that 
the CJEU is cautious, not very innovative and rigid in its way of reasoning. 
Nevertheless, the lexical analysis shows only a small part of the picture, and the 
way how the CJEU actually works with economics requires a deeper 
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examination. The assessment of the gradual reflection of economic arguments 
into legal reasoning reveals that the CJEU’s attitude to economics is unbalanced 
(and therefore still criticisable). In some parts of competition law, CJEU is 
willing and able to reflect economics quite precisely. However, there are still 
places where the CJEU rejects to accept arguments offered by economists, the 
Commission, parties or even commentators. Or at least, it is not deterrent 
absolutely to accept new suggested ideas, but generally, it does it with a kind of 
vigilance. 
In any event, the approach of the CJEU should be assessed in the light of its 
overall practice, scope of tasks, its methods and style of reasoning and could not 
be assessed separately just for the field of competition law. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the CJEU is very prone to rely on its own case law. The 
references to legal standards elaborated in preceding judgments make a 
considerable part of its argumentation when it comes to using economics. 
Moreover, the effort to keep at least some level of legal certainty leads to a kind 
of unwillingness to let new economic arguments enter legal reasoning. Last but 
not least, when examining the approach of the CJEU, it is necessary to take into 
consideration the very task of the CJEU – to control legality. 
Nonetheless, it rather reflects the general style of reasoning of the whole 
institution: the CJEU generally prefers quoting its own case law and is cautious 
when it comes to new (even economic) arguments. Once established legal test 
based on economics is then repeated in a mantra-like style and possible 
amendments, clarifications and changes are slow and very cautious. However, 
when the CJEU is pushed to deal with new questions (mainly the assessment of 
the methodology), it is willing to accept new arguments but still very carefully. 
There are still areas where the approach of the CJEU is more reluctant than in 
the others. While in pricing practices, defining relevant market and assessing 
dominance, the CJEU seems to understand the hard data, and therefore to accept 
the economic argument behind, in non-pricing practices such as fidelity rebates 
or exclusionary practices, it is still difficult to persuade the CJEU to turn the 
rudder towards more detailed economic arguments. 
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The different intensity of development in particular fields of abuse of dominance 
may be explained by the real-world evolution. While some “old” practices were 
defined and the classification of their harmfulness was settled long ago, “new” 
practices require new explanations, economic arguments and even legal 
standards in order to be assessed in their complexity. Therefore since the new 
phenomena call for new approaches, the CJEU has inevitably to accommodate 
them into its practice.  
It is a case of modern technologies which require a more creative attitude even 
from courts. Regarding such cases (Microsoft, Deutsche Telekom, France Télécom 
- Wanadoo), it is apparent that the CJEU is willing to respond to new challenges 
and to sink into questions about methodology and assessment of highly technical 
economic or econometric facts.  
Nevertheless, the findings confirm, at least for the field of 102 TFEU, the claim 
that the early judgments worked with economic arguments “in an imprecise and 
ad hoc manner”.304 The CJEU always has to simplify and generalize complex 
(and sometimes contradictory) economic arguments and considerations because, 
in order to serve to law, economic thoughts must be transformed into rather 
simplified normative statements. However, in earlier cases the translation of 
economic arguments into law was rather oversimplified. The CJEU relied on a 
formalistic approach and the finding that the conduct in question fulfils certain 
formal features inevitably lead to the conclusion of per se illegality without 
further analyses.  
On the other hand, from the whole overview, it is apparent that even the CJEU 
has been willing to abandon the strict formalism and to accommodate gradually 
new economic arguments into its practice. It seems that the CJEU has shifted its 
approach from simplistic normative statements into an attitude which takes into 
account more shades of the particular behaviour and its eventual effect on 
competition and consumers. In any event, there are still apparent discrepancies 
between various fields of assessment of abusive practices.   
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CONCLUSION 
It is a generally shared view that all courts are rigid institutions which are not 
willing to make revolutionary changes unless they are pushed to do so. The same 
may apply to the CJEU, even if it is sometimes considered as an activist court 
which goes far beyond what is expected from him. Courts need inspiration either 
from parties or other institutions, and only occasionally they are willing to go into 
a land which no other leg has touched before when they realize that there is no 
authority-like clue anywhere else. In competition cases, the European courts are 
maybe even more cautious than in other fields of EU law. It is apparent from the 
analyses above that they are not courageous enough to go ahead unless the new 
(economic) shift is suggested to them by the Commission, economists, academics 
or parties of the case.  
Thus it is not a surprise that the evolution of the economic reasoning of the 
CJEU is driven by external powers, and the CJEU succumbs to them with 
a varying intensity of reluctance. One explanatory aspect lies within the 
dispositive nature of the judicial review procedure. The sphere of preliminary 
references is not much different. Moreover, the courts feel bound by their 
previous case law and therefore every new (economic) argument must somehow 
fit into it. 180 degrees turns are not common. Even if the court wants to change 
its attitude to a specific issue, it tries to do it as smoothly as possible not to crash 
the previous case law explicitly in one moment. It is connected to the duty to keep 
legal certainty and also to the effort to keep its own authority. The judges 
presumably do not feel comfortable when they have to untie themselves from the, 
so far, stable and safe rope of case law. Every movement away presents a hard 
step and requires a deep consideration. The evolution is therefore slow and 
gradual. 
No one (hopefully) expects from judges to become economists who are dealing 
with complex economic and econometric studies full of numbers, graphics, 
equations, variables or derivations. And it must be recalled again that economic 
reasoning does not necessarily mean to count with numbers and to calculate 
variables. It is rather a way of thinking and logic of putting arguments in a line 
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which makes sense from the economic perspective. And such logic is not foreign 
to “classical” legal thinking. Economics helps to decode and decipher the line of 
arguments which must be put together to make a convincing conclusion which 
will be coherent with the goals of competition law. It is natural that for the needs 
of courts and judges, it is intrinsically necessary to simplify the economic 
knowledge and to put it in a form which will be comprehensible for judges and 
suitable for the needs of law. It is not a process of connecting two different worlds 
together but rather of bridging two sides of the same town. Competition law 
(regardless how much it is influenced by and derived from economics) is still a 
part of the legal order and in that way it must be dealt with. 
Anyway, a more friendly approach to economics is desirable even in the Court. 
The argument is simple: a tighter coherence with economics and a greater 
emphasis on effects (looked at through the prism of economics) serves better to 
the rights (mainly rights of defence) of investigated undertakings, and in the end, 
it leads to a more accurate maintenance of healthy competition and protection of 
consumers’ interests within the EU. This slightly normative appeal stems from 
the descriptive analysis: A lot has been done so far, the CJEU has proved that 
they are able to take into consideration even “foreign” or “extra-legal” arguments 
which, however, must be served to them in a digestible form.  
There are some fields of competition law (at least when limited to examined cases 
under art. 102 TFEU) where economists, competition lawyers and commentators 
in general would like to see the courts’ greater involvement into economics and 
maybe (as well) a better understanding of the economics behind. There are still 
many patterns of the reasoning which may be criticisable. But, as it was shown 
above, the evolution of economic reasoning is a gradual process and the adaption 
of courts is slow.  
Let us conclude with a kind of optimism for future development. Even if the 
current state of economic reasoning of courts is far from the ideal state 
economists would prefer and even if economists claim that the courts do not 
understand economics properly and do not follow correctly their ideas, I would 
counterclaim that it does not matter (so much). What is the most praiseworthy 
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thing is the mere evolution and development of ideas. Discussion and sharing 
ideas would ideally lead to clarification of the approach to competition law which 
would better serve the goals of European competition policy, would not hurt 
business and would be in the benefit of consumers. Taking it optimistically, the 
courts have shown the capability and willingness to adopt economic reasoning 
into the purely legal one and to reflect new suggestions from the Commission, 
economists and competition lawyers. So, maybe even the critics will be eventually 
satisfied and the CJEU will–step by step–fulfil their expectations. 
In any event, it is not a duty for the CJEU to accept everything the economists 
and economic theory call for. The gap itself between economic theory and the 
actual practice of the CJEU cannot be considered something for which the CJEU 
should be automatically blamed. It just proves the existence of the difference in 
the episteme and in the respective roles and positions of lawyers and economists 
in competition law. Therefore the practice of the CJEU should be thoroughly 
assessed and even criticised, but always with bearing in mind that its role is to 
guarantee rule of law in the EU, not the rule of economics.   
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